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Rethinking International
Insolvency: The Neglected Role of
Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory
HANNAH L. BUXBAUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a period marked by the development of numerous treaties, conventions
and statutes designed to regulate international business, the field of interna-
tional bankruptcy remains disturbingly resistant to reform. Most of the major
initiatives proposed in past decades have failed completely; others, though
adopted, have had only moderate impact.' As a result, the bankruptcy of a
multinational enterprise typically triggers diverse and uncoordinated legal pro-
ceedings in various countries connected to the affairs of that enterprise. This
lack of coordination imposes substantial costs both on the bankruptcy process
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. LL.M., 1993, Uni-
versity of Heidelberg; J.D., 1992, Cornell Law School; B.A., 1987, Cornell University. I would
like to thank Douglass Boshkoff, Bruce Markell, Aviva Orenstein, Gene Shreve, and Kellye Testy
for their comments on earlier versions of this article, and am grateful for summer research support
from the Indiana University School of Law.
I Initiatives in the area have included bilateral and multilateral treaties (e.g., the Council of
Europe's Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (the "Istanbul Convention")
and the draft treaty between the United States and Canada); model laws (e.g., the Model Interna-
tional Insolvency Cooperation Act and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency discussed
herein); a bar initiative (the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat); and the American Law Institute's
ongoing North American Transnational Insolvency Project. For an overview of these various ini-
tiatives and their reception, see Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analy-
sis and Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L. J. 135
(1992); Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L.
573 (1993); and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 563 (1996). In 1997, the European Union adopted the first full-fledged convention addressing
cross-border insolvencies within the Union. See Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention
on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (1996); Eberhard Schollmeyer, The New
European Convention on Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1997).
Surveying over a century's worth of attempts to create a coherent regime recently prompted a
commentator to characterize international bankruptcies as an insoluble problem. See generally
Donna McKenzie, International Solutions to International Insolvency: An Insoluble Problem?, 26
BALT. L. REv. 15 (1997).
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itself (for instance, by multiplying administrative expenses) and on interna-
tional commerce generally (by preventing lenders from predicting accurately
the consequences of debtor insolvency).2 The need for a method of addressing
international insolvencies that is fair, predictable, and consistent therefore re-
mains pronounced.
The movement to reform international bankruptcy law has been cast
largely as a struggle between two opposing camps: universality and territorial-
ity. For the past few decades, universalists-who argue that international
bankruptcies should be administered by a single forum-have been winning
the battle. 3 Universalists argue that the centralized administration of cross-
border bankruptcies will provide (1) equality of treatment for all creditors; (2)
maximization of the value of the bankruptcy estate; (3) expeditious and effi-
cient administration of the estate; and (4) predictability of outcome.4 Univer-
salist principles have shaped the discourse as well as the goals of the bank-
ruptcy reform movement.
Today, however, the consensus that has long existed in favor of universal-
ity seems to be weakening. 5 Territoriality, which favors the simultaneous ad-
ministration of multiple local bankruptcies, is gaining currency among com-
mentators. 6 On the legislative front, the international bankruptcy provisions of
the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, while purporting to foster uni-
versality, reveal only a partial commitment to the universality approach. 7 Fi-
nally, recent cases evidence the increasing tendency of courts to abandon the
battlefield altogether by handling cross-border bankruptcies in an extraregula-
tory fashion.8
These trends do not reflect an outright abandonment of the fundamental
goals of universality. Rather, they reveal frustration with the continuing failure
of reform efforts to achieve these goals, as well as a pragmatic acceptance of
the enduring vitality of territorialism.9 In the belief that the goals of universal-
ity remain relevant, I view this emerging dissatisfaction with international
bankruptcy theory as an invitation to reexamine that theory.
2 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of
Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457, 460-61 (1991) [hereinafter Theory and
Pragmatism].
3 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Ap-
proach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 698-99 (1999).
4 See Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 460-61; Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Ap-
proach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1, 17-18 (1997).
5 In 1888, John Lowell observed that "in the present state of commerce and communication,
it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their credi-
tors should be made in a single proceeding and generally at a single place." John Lowell, Conflicts
of Law as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, I HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888).
6 See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 700-701 (identifying the growing acceptance even among
universalists of solutions that incorporate territorial elements).
7 See infra Part II.B.2.a for a discussion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.
8 See infra Part II.B.2.b for a discussion of extraregulatory decisionmaking.
9 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEx. INT. L.J. 27, 43 (1998) [herein-
after Universal Priorities].
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The development of solutions to cross-border insolvency is patently a
choice-of-law problem: How do we choose the law applicable to a transna-
tional bankruptcy proceeding, or to a particular aspect of that proceeding? In-
terestingly, however, international bankruptcy law has not been analyzed
against the backdrop of traditional conflict-of-laws thinking. Instead, the
bankruptcy-specific doctrines of universality and territoriality have framed the
discussion of choice-of-law issues.10 In this Article, I expand the analysis of
international bankruptcy law beyond the confines of the sometimes unhelpful
universality/territoriality dichotomy by examining the developments in cross-
border bankruptcy law from a consciously conflicts-oriented perspective.
The current regime under which cross-border bankruptcies are adminis-
tered in U.S. courts-a regime based on the universality model-incorporates
no explicit choice-of-law rule. A close analysis of its operation, however, re-
veals the existence of a conflicts approach. Although this approach is theoreti-
cally well suited to achieve the goals of universality, it is imperfect. I believe
that by viewing the international bankruptcy system through the lens of tradi-
tional conflicts principles, we can uncover unarticulated choice-of-law issues
and suggest refinements to that regime. Rather than accept the current trend
away from universality, in other words, this Article proposes to use a rigorous
analysis of choice-of-law values in developing a better version of universality.
Part II of this Article presents the competing theories of international in-
solvency, universality and territoriality, and the modified universality approach
chosen by the U.S. legislature. It then reviews the provisions of the United
States Bankruptcy Code ("Bankruptcy Code") that implement the modified
universality approach and analyzes the choice-of-law problems they present.
Part III departs from the structure imposed by the universality/territoriality di-
chotomy and resituates the U.S. regulatory approach within the broader
framework of choice-of-law methodology. It concludes that U.S. international
bankruptcy law operates as a multilateralist system. Part IV then assesses
whether multilateralism is in fact an appropriate method for resolving choice-
of-law issues in international bankruptcy, concluding that it is. Finally, Part V
analyzes possible refinements to the international bankruptcy approach of the
United States based on its multilateral nature, suggesting that the adoption of a
more deliberate multilateralism would serve the goals of this system. The Ar-
ticle concludes with some thoughts on the future of the universality approach.
10 This is not to say that the choice-of-law implications of cross-border bankruptcies have
been ignored. See, e.g., John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631 (1980); Kurt Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Reform Act and
Conflict of Laws: Trial-and-Error, 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 27 (1988); Theory and Pragmatism, supra
note 2; Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflict of Laws Issues in International
Insolvencies, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY LAW (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) [hereinafter CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS]. I point out
only that such discussions use the language of universality and territoriality rather than that of tra-
ditional conflicts theory.
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II. THE U.S. APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
The discussion surrounding the resolution of international insolvencies has
been framed by the opposing theories of universality and territoriality. Univer-
sality maintains that a single forum should administer the bankruptcy of an in-
solvent corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding would reach all assets of the
debtor, wherever located, and would distribute those assets to all creditors,
wherever located. I I In its purest form, sometimes referred to as "unity," this
theory maintains that only one legitimate forum exists for the administration of
any bankruptcy, and that the appropriate court has full jurisdiction to adminis-
ter the assets and make distributions to creditors pursuant to its own law.12
Supporters of universality, particularly in its purest form, identify as its advan-
tages both increased efficiency of the bankruptcy process itself 13 and a reduc-
tion in the cost of international credit.14 In addition, they argue that it is a
fairer approach in that it secures equality in the treatment of all creditors,
wherever located.15
Territoriality, on the other hand, adheres to the "grab rule." Each country
in which assets of the debtor are located distributes those assets to its own
creditors pursuant to its own bankruptcy law. Territoriality is defended as both
easier to administer and fairer to local creditors: They need not submit claims
in a foreign proceeding, and will not be disadvantaged by the application of
foreign bankruptcy law. 16
Universality and territoriality represent the poles of international insol-
vency theory; in practice, most jurisdictions have adopted approaches that fall
11 See PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 228 (1995) ("The bank-
ruptcy applies to all the debtor's assets globally and not just local assets.").
12 In a less pure incarnation of universality, the forum court would require the assistance of
courts in other countries at the enforcement stage. Commentators have defined the terms "unity"
and "universality" somewhat flexibly. See, e.g., Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention
on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Proceedings, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119, 121 (1998); Hans
Hanisch, "Universality" Versus Secondary Bankruptcy: A European Debate, 2 INT'L INSOL. REV.
151, 151-53 (1993); and LoPucki, supra note 3, at 704. The Reporter's Notes to the American
Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project describe "unity" as involving a choice of forum,
where "universality" involves the choice of a single legal regime. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY LAW: TENTATIVE DRAFT 139, n.226 (1997). Professor Dalhuisen, however, suggests
that universality assumes the full international effect of local bankruptcy adjudications on the basis
of unity of the debtor's estate and unity of the creditor group. J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY 2.03[3] (1986).
13 A single bankruptcy administration would avoid the costs of multiple simultaneous pro-
ceedings. In addition, the value of the debtor corporation, both in liquidation and in reorganization,
would be better preserved if all assets were under the control of a single court. See WOOD, supra
note 11, at 228; Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 461.
14 See Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 466; see also LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK &
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES (1998) (arguing
that universality also promotes a more efficient allocation of capital).
15 See WOOD, supra note 11, at 228.
16 See id.
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between them.17 In a form more moderate than absolute unity, the doctrine of
universality can still favor a single bankruptcy proceeding while acknowledg-
ing that in certain circumstances a local proceeding might be necessary.18 This
lesser form of universalism is usually described as "modified universality." 19
In systems using this approach, parties may open proceedings in additional ju-
risdictions that are ancillary to the main bankruptcy proceeding.20 These an-
cillary proceedings are intended primarily to assist the main proceeding-and
therefore further the basic goals of universality-but also protect the right of
the forum to apply its own law in certain situations. Farther yet from pure
unity lie systems that contemplate a series of "secondary bankruptcies" in
which local assets are distributed pursuant to local law for the benefit of local
creditors, with any remaining assets remitted to the foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 21
A. International Bankruptcy in the United States: Modified Universality
The provisions that U.S. courts currently apply to international insolven-
cies were adopted as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.22 In drafting
those provisions, Congress embraced the modified universality approach. The
provisions governing international aspects of bankruptcy assume the desirabil-
ity of collecting and distributing the assets of the debtor on a worldwide basis,
even when the distribution will be administered by a foreign court.23 At the
same time, however, they acknowledge the need to protect local creditors from
prejudice or other unfairness in the foreign proceeding. 24 The system chosen is
thus committed to the goals of universality, but modified to protect territorial
interests when necessary.
1. Provisions Concerning the Effect of U. S. Bankruptcy Proceedings in
Other Countries
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 541, a bankruptcy proceeding initi-
ated in the United States extends to all property of the debtor, wherever lo-
17 See Universal Priorities, supra note 9, at 29 (describing "the realities of a world of modi-
fied territorialism").
18 See Hanisch, supra note 12, at 156.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings adopts a secondary bank-
ruptcy system. For a description of the Convention, see Fletcher, supra note 12; Balz, supra note 1;
and Schollmeyer, supra note 1.
22 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
23 See infra Part II.B.I .a for a discussion of legislative history.
24 See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 304(c)(2), (4) (1994).
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cated. 25 Global treatment is also afforded to all claimholders, wherever lo-
cated. The claims of foreign creditors are admissible on equal footing with the
claims of domestic creditors, and foreign creditors are able to share equally in
the proceeds of the bankruptcy estate. 26
2. Provisions Concerning the Effect of Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings in
the United States
The initiation of foreign bankruptcy proceedings has no immediate effect
in the United States. The Bankruptcy Code establishes a two-step process for
considering pendent foreign proceedings. First, the foreign representative must
establish that he was duly appointed in a proceeding opened for the purpose of
liquidating or reorganizing the debtor's estate.27 Once recognized, the foreign
representative may pursue one or more of three routes. He may initiate a full-
blown involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor;28 seek the dis-
missal of a pending bankruptcy proceeding initiated in a U.S. court by local
creditors or by the debtor itself;29 or initiate an ancillary proceeding under
Section 304.
Section 304 proceedings 30 constitute the core of U.S. international bank-
ruptcy law and embody Congressional endorsement of modified universality.
Section 304 permits the representative of a foreign bankruptcy to institute a
proceeding ancillary to a liquidation, reorganization or similar proceeding al-
ready underway abroad. A Section 304 filing does not initiate a full bank-
ruptcy proceeding under U.S. law, and therefore neither creates a bankruptcy
estate nor imposes an automatic stay on collection activities by creditors.3 It
merely establishes a mechanism permitting the representative of a foreign pro-
ceeding to recover or administer property of the debtor located in the United
States. 32 Courts have broad discretion to order various types of relief in favor
of foreign representatives, including the issuance of injunctions preventing lo-
cal creditors from levying on assets of the debtor, the suspension or dismissal
25 See II U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994). Of course, the effect of this provision outside the United
States depends on whether the law of the country in which the property is located recognizes the
authority of the U.S. bankruptcy court to administer the assets.
26 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 507 (1994).
27 See II U.S.C. § 101(23), (24) (1994).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1994). Such a proceeding would then be conducted concurrent
with the proceeding pending abroad.
29 See I 1 U.S.C § 305(a)(2) (1994).
30 Any proceeding brought pursuant to Section 303, 304 or 305 of the Bankruptcy Code is
commonly referred to as a "Section 304" proceeding, and this Article adopts that convention.
31 See Thomas C. Given & Victor A. Vilaplana, Comity Revisited: Multinational Bankruptcy
Cases Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 325, 330 (1983). By seek-
ing the injunctive relief permitted by Section 304(b)(1), however, a foreign representative can
achieve substantially the same relief with respect to property of the bankruptcy estate located in the
United States as that provided by Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
32 See id. at 328.
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of local actions relating to property of the estate, and the turnover of assets (or
control over assets) to the foreign representative. 33
The legislative history of Section 304 indicates clearly that the function of
the ancillary proceeding is to assist the foreign proceeding by protecting assets
located in the United States from attachment or dismemberment by individual
creditors, thereby preserving their value for distribution with the rest of the
bankruptcy estate. 34 Such assistance, however, is not automatic. While courts
have discretion to help the foreign representative, they also have discretion to
protect the interests of local creditors. Section 304(c) provides that:
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this
section, the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economi-
cal and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice
and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign pro-
ceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
33 Section 304(b) provides that a court may:
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or
any act or the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or en-
force a lien against the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property, to such
foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994).
34 The legislative history clarifies the intent of Congress in this regard: Section 304 was en-
acted to enhance the efficiency of foreign bankruptcy representatives in marshaling and distributing
the assets of the debtor. See Stuart A. Krause et al., Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code: Clarifying the Principal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORD. L. REv.
2591, 2594-95 (1996) (characterizing Congressional intent as "encouraging courts to lean toward a
universality approach by giving greater deference to the foreign proceeding"). There is no inten-
tion that the local proceeding would compete with the foreign one.
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(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.35
Thus, under certain circumstances, domestic courts may choose not to af-
ford the foreign representative the sorts of relief contemplated by Section
304(b). Instead, they may permit local creditors to attach the assets with a
view to exercising collection remedies pursuant to state law, or take other
measures preventing such creditors from being subjected to the foreign pro-
ceeding. While the ancillary proceeding therefore aims to facilitate the recog-
nition of, and encourage deferral to, bankruptcy proceedings initiated in other
jurisdictions, that universalist inclination is tempered by concern for the rights
of local creditors.
B. The Choice-of-Law Problematic
Modified universality, while attractive on a theoretical basis, has proved
difficult to apply fairly, consistently or predictably. Because Section 304 in-
corporates both universal and territorial elements, it permits courts to decide
cases in a rather unsystematic way. Its very flexibility allows a court to reach
whichever result it desires, be it universal or territorial in nature. Although the
fair resolution of any individual case is of course desirable, unpredictability of
outcome is not. This is especially true in international bankruptcy, where un-
certainty as to the possible consequences of a debtor's bankruptcy renders
creditor planning difficult and cross-border lending unduly risky.36 Unfortu-
nately, Section 304 contains no choice-of-law rule to guide judicial decision-
making.
1. Choice of Law in Current International Bankruptcy Law
The focus of international bankruptcy jurisprudence has long been on the
choice of forum. Universality and territoriality, in other words, are theories
developed to answer the question whether a cross-border insolvency should be
administered in a single forum or multiple fora. No court, however, will con-
duct bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to the bankruptcy laws of another juris-
diction; a bankruptcy proceeding administered in a particular forum will neces-
sarily be administered pursuant to the bankruptcy law of that forum.37 For this
35 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994).
36 See infra Part IV.B for a description of the effect of unpredictablity on commercial lending.
See also LoPucki, supra note 3, at 728 (suggesting that this flexibility therefore sacrifices the ad-
vantages claimed by the universality approach).
37 See DALHUISEN, supra note 12, at § 1.07[2], 3-96.14 (" [T]here is usually no freedom for
the rendering court but to apply its own bankruptcy law in its entirety .... "). Courts may, of
course, choose to apply the law of another jurisdiction to particular aspects of the bankruptcy ad-
ministration. They may, for instance, apply foreign law to determine whether a creditor has secured
status. But the law applied to the core issues of priority among creditors and distribution of assets
will be forum law. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 12.
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reason, choice of forum and choice of law are intertwined in the area of inter-
national bankruptcy. 38 Under unity, once a bankruptcy proceeding commences
in the debtor's home jurisdiction, courts in other countries will accept that
court's authority to administer all assets and satisfy all creditor claims pursuant
to its bankruptcy law. 39 Similarly, under territoriality, courts in each country in
which assets of the debtor are located will exercise their respective rights to
conduct separate proceedings pursuant to their own bankruptcy law.40 By pro-
viding a fixed rule for the selection of forum, unity and territoriality thus also
determine the selection of applicable law.
The choice-of-law result is less clear in systems that adopt a position be-
tween the poles of unity and territoriality simply because in such systems the
choice of forum is not automatic. Once a bankruptcy proceeding has been ini-
tiated in a certain country-assume, for example, the home jurisdiction of the
debtor-the courts in other jurisdictions must decide whether to defer to that
proceeding or to conduct a local one. Because the court administering the pro-
ceeding will apply its own bankruptcy law, that choice of forum serves the
secondary function of a choice of law.
Two examples of common situations facing U.S. courts, each implicating
the distribution of assets of an insolvent debtor, will illustrate the choice-of-law
questions embedded in decisions relating to jurisdiction. In the first, a U.S.
court has pending before it a proceeding initiated by a local creditor to attach
certain assets, located in the United States, of a foreign debtor. An action is
then brought by a foreign representative under Sections 304 and 305, seeking
to have the attachment proceedings dismissed41 and the assets turned over for
distribution in a bankruptcy proceeding initiated against the debtor in its home
jurisdiction.4 2 In a second common situation, the action pending before the
U.S. court is an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor, initiated
by local creditors. 43 An action is then brought by a foreign representative
seeking to have the entire U.S. bankruptcy proceeding dismissed in favor of a
proceeding already underway in the debtor's home jurisdiction. The resolution
of these actions under either a unity system or a territoriality system would re-
38 See Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 471 (identifying the general failure to distin-
guish between the two and then arguing that the forum court should apply its own bankruptcy law
to the greatest extent possible); see also Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 10, at 668 ("Because it
is traditional that the bankruptcy court applies its local law, there is no choice of law process as
such to deal with important issues that vary from country to country.").
39 See text accompanying supra note 12 for a description of unity.
40 See text accompanying supra note 16 for a discussion of territoriality.
41 While Section 304 only provides for an injunction against the commencement or continua-
tion of a case, Section 305 provides that such a case may be dismissed. Another alternative open to
the foreign representative would be to petition the court for a local concurrent bankruptcy pro-
ceeding pursuant to Section 303(b)(4). See Honsberger, supra note 10, at 653.
42 See In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (seeking to enjoin the continuation of
efforts by a U.S. creditor to attach assets of the debtor located in the United States).
43 See Interpool v. M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (moving to dismiss
competing bankruptcy proceedings filed under Chapter 7 against the debtor by U.S. creditors).
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quire no choice at all: In the case of unity, the authority of the foreign court
would be recognized; in the case of territoriality, it would not.
In a modified universality system, however, the U.S. court must choose. In
the first case, the court may either dismiss the attachment action and turn the
assets over to the foreign bankruptcy proceeding, or ignore the claims of the
foreign representative and permit the local creditor to attach the assets. Al-
though this decision is cast as a choice of the forum in which the assets will be
administered, it amounts to a choice of law relating to the distribution of the
estate. If the assets are turned over, they will be distributed according to the
bankruptcy rules of the foreign court (which may or may not favor the local
creditor). If they are not, the creditor will be able to attach the assets and exer-
cise any appropriate remedies available to it under U.S. state law. In the sec-
ond case, too, the court makes an implicit choice-of-law decision. If the local
bankruptcy action is dismissed,44 the local creditors will submit their claims to
administration under foreign bankruptcy law; if the local bankruptcy proceed-
ing goes forward, the Bankruptcy Code will apply. In deciding whether or not
to defer to the foreign representative-in choosing a forum-the court is thus
engaging simultaneously in a choice of law.
Unfortunately, Section 304 does not incorporate a principled choice-of-law
approach. There are two distinct areas in which the absence of a conflicts
method is apparent. First, Section 304 does not instruct courts to consider the
interests, relative or absolute, of the United States and any foreign jurisdiction
in the application of their respective laws to the bankruptcy proceeding.4 5 In
other words, a local proceeding initiated by a small local creditor when the
debtor and all other creditors are located in a single foreign jurisdiction is not
distinguished from a local proceeding brought by a large group of U.S. credi-
tors when the debtor has major local operations and other substantial contacts
with the United States. Subject only to the general guidelines set forth in Sec-
tion 304(c), supplemented by the instruction that the court should strive to en-
sure an "economical and expeditious administration" of the bankruptcy estate,
the decision whether or not to. defer is left entirely to the discretion of the
court. Second, the Section 304(c) factors themselves do not reveal an under-
lying choice-of-law approach. The various elements listed in Section 304(c)
point in different directions: Some justify a territorialist protection of domestic
creditors, 46 while others promote a cooperative, universalist approach. 47 In ad-
44 A court might also dismiss a competing local bankruptcy proceeding under Section 305,
which provides that the U.S. court may dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding if a foreign proceeding is
pending and the Section 304(c) factors warrant dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
45 See Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29
HARV. INT'LL. J. 49, 51 (1988).
46 Most notably Section 304(c)(4), which provides that the distribution of proceeds under for-
eign law should be "substantially in accordance" with the order of distribution dictated by the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S. C. § 304(c)(4) (1994). See infra Part V.B.2 for a discussion of cases in
which Section 304(c)(4) has been applied in a protectionist fashion.
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dition, there is no indication of the weight to be assigned to any given factor or,
more generally, whether the factors are meant to be balanced against one an-
other at all.48 Thus, each case decided under Section 304 necessitates the de-
velopment and application of an ad-hoc choice-of-law analysis. 49
In this respect, then, the modified universality approach lacks even the
subtextual choice-of-law orientation of the unity and territoriality approaches.
Cases decided under Section 304 reflect this absence. With few exceptions,50
U.S. courts do not frame their analysis in terms of typical conflicts considera-
tions, and they refrain from traditional choice-of-law analysis such as a consid-
eration of contacts within a particular jurisdiction.
2. Choice of Law and Recent Developments
Viewed solely from the perspective of results, the U.S. international bank-
ruptcy system seems to be functioning as intended. Despite a handful of oft
criticized cases that use a territorialist approach at odds with the goals of Sec-
tion 304,51 the majority of decisions in cross-border bankruptcy cases favor the
claims of the foreign representative. 52 Two recent developments, however,
herald changes in the orientation of U.S. international insolvency law. First,
the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (" Reform Act" )53 in certain re-
47 Section 304(c)(I) suggests a universal approach, pursuant to which all creditors-wher-
ever located-would be treated equally. See I I U.S. C. § 304(c)(1) (1994); Trautman, supra note
45, at 52.
48 There is also nothing to prevent courts from considering additional factors. See Honsber-
ger, supra note 10, at 655. Some courts, far from attempting to balance the factors, have viewed at
least one of the guidelines (Section 304(c)(4)) as an individual test that must be passed in order for
a foreign proceeding to be recognized. See Melissa S. Rimel, American Recognition of Interna-
tional Insolvency Proceedings: Deciphering Section 304(c), 9 BANKR. DEV. L. J. 453, 481 (1992);
see also In re Toga Manufacturing, 28 B.R. 165, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding that since
distribution would not take place substantially in accordance with U.S. distribution rules, the court
need not defer to the foreign proceeding). Similarly, the many decisions relying on considerations
of comity often turn on that single factor alone. The use df the comity guideline is discussed more
extensively infra Part III.B. 1.
49 Given & Vilaplana, supra note 31, at 331.
50 See, e.g., In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 628-629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that the Ba-
hamas had a greater interest in the liquidation of the debtor, since "neither the United States nor the
State of New York has any governmental or public interest in [its] liquidation"); In re Maxwell
Communication Corporation, 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (examining the contacts
each jurisdiction involved has with the controversy); In re Koreag, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The goal of this analysis is to evaluate the various contacts each jurisdiction has with the contro-
versy, and determine which jurisdiction's laws and policies are implicated to the greatest extent.").
51 See, e.g., In re Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); Interpool v. M/V Venture Star,
102 B.R. 373 (Dist. N.J. 1988). These cases are critiqued in Krause et al., supra note 34, at 2601-
03.
52 1 am unaware of any comprehensive empirical study of international bankruptcy decisions
in U.S. courts, but believe cases such as In re Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) and In-
terpool v. M/V Venture Star 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) to be exceptions to the prevalent
approach. See Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Lib-
eralism, Institutionalism and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAw & POE'Y INT L Bus. 1037,
1074 (1997) (describing the "increasing tendency to defer to and assist the primary bankruptcy").
53 H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter "Reform Act"]. H.R. 833 was passed by the
House of Representatives on May 5, 1999; a parallel bill, S. 625, is pending in the Senate.
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spects undermines the goals of universality by confirming the privileged status
of local proceedings. Second, the growing tendency of courts to seek ex-
traregulatory solutions to international insolvencies suggests the increasing ir-
relevance of the current framework to the decisionmaking process.
a. The Reform Act
The Model Law incorporated in the Reform Act, whose goal is to facilitate
the administration of unified international bankruptcy proceedings, embodies a
modified universalist approach.5 4 It does not, however, set forth a complete
framework for the resolution of cross-border bankruptcies; instead, it creates a
set of procedural rules to be integrated into the substantive bankruptcy law of
each state that adopts the Model Law. Rather than attempting to harmonize
substantive bankruptcy principles, the Model Law seeks merely to make the
process by which foreign bankruptcy representatives gain recognition in and
assistance of courts in other jurisdictions simpler and less discretionary.55
Under the Reform Act, a court must recognize the foreign representative of
a bankruptcy initiated in another jurisdiction if that representative provides
certain required documents. 56 Because recognition is not discretionary, the
process will be completed quickly and dissipation of the assets in the forum ju-
risdiction will be rendered less likely.5 7 The Reform Act also creates a mecha-
nism for the imposition of an automatic stay.58 A stay on actions against the
debtor or property of the debtor located within the United States will be im-
posed automatically upon recognition of the foreign representative in a pro-
ceeding initiated in the debtor's home jurisdiction. Upon recognition of the
Title IX of the Reform Act incorporates the provisions of the Model Law on Cross-Border In-
solvency ("Model Law") in its new Chapter 15, which addresses ancillary and cross-border cases.
The Model Law was drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") and was adopted at UNCITRAL's 30th session in May of 1997. UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Report of UNCITRAL on the Work of its Thirtieth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex I, at 68-578, U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997), reprinted in Andrd J. Ber-
ends, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 401(1998) [hereinafter Model Law]. See also The Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency, [1997] 28 YB. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n, at pt.3, § 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/442, reprinted in Berends [hereinafter Guide to Enactment]. Id. at 419. For a discussion
of the process leading to the adoption of the Model Law, see Thomas M. Gaa & Paula E. Garzon,
International Creditors'Rights and Bankruptcy, 31 INT'L LAw. 273 (1997).
54 That is, it embraces the goals of universality, but provides for local proceedings in certain
circumstances. See supra Part II.A. I for a discussion of modified universality.
55 See Guide to Enactment, supra note 53, at 419.
56 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1515(b), (c). The documents required amount to proof
from a foreign court that the representative has been duly appointed. Section 1516(b) provides
further that the court to which those documents are submitted is entitled to rely on their authentic-
ity. Reform Act, supra note 52, § 1516(b).
57 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1517(a) (providing that "an order recognizing a foreign
proceeding shall be entered" if the procedural requirements are met) (emphasis added). Section
1517(c) indicates that the application for recognition must be considered as quickly as possible. Id.
§ 1517(c).
58 In this respect, the Reform Act is more generous to foreign representatives than the exist-
ing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, as the initiation of a Section 304 proceeding does not result
in the creation of an automatic stay. See Given & Vilaplana, supra note 31, at 330.
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foreign representative in a proceeding initiated elsewhere, the court may, in its
discretion, order such a stay.59 In streamlining these procedural aspects of the
bankruptcy process, the Reform Act thus serves the goals of universality by
preserving local assets for administration in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding.
Additional provisions of the Reform Act, however, undermine this result
by recognizing the continuing pull of territoriality. A court need not leave the
automatic stay in place. It may choose to do so, and may also order further re-
lief to the foreign representative. 60 Alternatively, however, the court may
choose in the interest of local creditors to modify or even terminate the stay
and any other provisional relief that it has granted.61 At this point, then, the
court must make a choice of law. It may choose foreign bankruptcy law, by
allowing the relief to stand, or it may choose U.S. law, by terminating that re-
lief and permitting a local action to proceed. The Reform Act provides scant
guidance for this decision, noting merely that "the interests of creditors in the
United States [must be] sufficiently protected." 62 Because the Reform Act
does not define "sufficient protection," a U.S. court must at this stage consult
pre-Reform Act law in considering whether to protect local creditors or to as-
sist the foreign representative. 63 Presumably, the factors previously included in
Section 304(c)-together with the choice-of-law problems they present64-will
at this stage be drawn into the analysis. In addition to importing territorial
factors in this way, the Reform Act also clearly recognizes the precedence of a
local proceeding over a foreign one when concurrent bankruptcy proceedings
have been filed.65 Thus, in explicitly recognizing and deferring to a court's
59 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1520(a) (stay in "main" proceedings) and § 1521(a)
(stay in "non-main" proceedings). Additionally, Section 1519 provides that a temporary stay may
be imposed, pending recognition, upon successful petition by the foreign representative. Id. §
1519. See infra Part III.B.l.b for a discussion of the distinction between "main" and "non-main"
proceedings.
60 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1521. Section 1521 permits the court, for instance, to
order the turnover of assets located in the United States to the foreign representative.
61 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1522. Section 1522 speaks directly to relief granted in
the discretion of the court, under Section 1519 and Section 1521, and not to the relief granted
automatically under Section 1520 to foreign main proceedings. But see Reform Act section
1520(b), whose counterpart in the Model Law was intended to provide that even the automatic re-
lief granted upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding could be modified by the local court.
See Berends, supra note 53, at 374.
62 This provision applies in connection with the turnover of assets to the foreign representa-
tive. Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1521(b). See also Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1522(a) (pro-
viding that "the interests of the creditors... [must be] sufficiently protected" for relief to be
granted under Sections 1519 or 1521).
63 This referral to preexisting bankruptcy analysis limits the scope of the Reform Act, ren-
dering it more procedural than substantive.
64 See discussion supra Part Il.B.1.
65 See, e.g., Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1529(2) (providing that if a local proceeding is
commenced after recognition of the foreign representative, any stay imposed pursuant to Section
1519, 1520 or 1521 "shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent with" the local proceeding);
see also Berends, supra note 53, at 388 ("the basic rule of [Model Law] Article 29 is that there is a
pre-eminence of the local proceeding over the foreign proceeding").
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ability to implement a territorial approach, the Reform Act not only falls short
of its promise of universality but gives new vitality to territoriality.66
b. Extraregulatory Decisionmaking
It is indisputable that U.S. courts tend to defer to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 67 Many of the most successful recent cross-border insolvency pro-
ceedings, however, have been resolved by means of procedures outside the
regulatory framework. Ad-hoc agreements crafted by the courts and the par-
ties have formed the basis of reorganizations and asset distributions in these
international bankruptcies.
The judges in these proceedings view their role as that of creative planners
responsible for facilitating resolutions satisfactory to the bankruptcy partici-
pants. 68 The widely publicized bankruptcy of Maxwell Communication Cor-
poration provides an excellent illustration of how such proceedings are con-
ducted. In that case, the Justice presiding over a full insolvency proceeding in
England and the U.S. judge hearing Chapter 11 proceedings in the United
States, with the assistance of the administrators and examiner they respectively
appointed, formulated a Protocol intended to guide the bankruptcy administra-
tion.69 The Protocol provided the framework for a plan of reorganization-ul-
timately adopted-that harmonized inconsistent provisions of domestic and
foreign bankruptcy law. 70 This judicial agreement thus relied on ad-hoc har-
monization rather than on systematic choice-of-law analysis. Several other
cross-border bankruptcies, involving both the United States and countries in-
cluding Canada, Israel, and Japan, have adopted a similar approach.7'
On the one hand, these cases reveal salutary cooperation and coordination
between courts, enabling them to reach fact-specific solutions in difficult
66 It may be that this latent territorialism reflects a political compromise necessary to ensure
the adoption of UNCITRAL's Model Law by member countries, and that the further step of sub-
stantive change is one that will take place in the future. As it stands now, however, it represents an
acceptance of territoriality.
67 The lack of systemwide predictability remains troubling, however, in terms of transaction
costs.
68 In reviewing several recent bankruptcies, one commentator notes that the judges presiding
over the proceedings view their function "as creating international legal cooperative structures in
the field of international insolvency." Unt, supra note 52, at 1073-74.
69 For an analysis of the case, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Com-
munication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996).
70 For a thorough discussion of the harmonization process, see Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J.
Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the Maxwell Communica-
tion Corporation Insolvency, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 621.
71 See, e.g., In re Maruko, 200 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 763
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1996); In re Everfresh Beverages, 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Re-
form Act includes provisions intended to foster-indeed, to require-this sort of cooperation. See
Reform Act, supra note 53, §§ 1525-1527.
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cases. 72 On the other hand, however, they reinforce the failure of the existing
regulatory framework to provide a useful choice-of-law system and thereby the
certainty for creditors that is an important goal of international bankruptcy
rules. 73
C. Conclusion
Although courts have by and large complied with the stated preference of
the legislature for a universality-based approach, the regulatory structure fails
to ensure consistent and predictable results. While this failure may be cast as a
failure of the universality approach itself,74 this Article suggests instead that it
reflects the neglected role of choice-of-law analysis in this field. Neither the
current provisions regulating international insolvency nor the provisions of the
Reform Act, although they require courts to make what amounts to a choice-
of-law decision, guide that analysis in a meaningful way. Rather than accept
the shift away from universality suggested by the developments described
above, it would be appropriate first to use conflict-of-laws analysis to examine
the regulatory scheme more closely. In doing so, it is not enough to observe
that Section 304 does not contain an explicit choice-of-law mechanism.
Rather, since decisions regarding whether to defer to foreign proceedings op-
erate as a choice of law, it is necessary to analyze that operation. How do
courts apply Section 304, and what form of conflicts methodology can be seen
emerging from that application?
72 They also take full advantage of technological advances and arguably simply adjust the
level of cooperation to what is now technically feasible. See E. Bruce Leonard, The Way Ahead:
Protocols in International Insolvency Cases, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (1999).
73 Interestingly, Section 304 itself was adopted partially in response to exactly such a situa-
tion: the 1975 failure of the Herstatt bank, which revealed the insufficiency of the existing regula-
tions. See Honsberger, supra note 10, at 674 ("The settlement that ended the Herstatt litigation was
characterized as a cry of despair for the lack of any rational procedure."). See generally Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Com-
pany, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. I (1977).
That the participants in cross-border bankruptcy adjudications perceive the current regulatory
framework as inadequate is in itself troubling. Furthermore, it seems possible that ad-hoc methods
of resolution do not protect all participants in a bankruptcy to the same extent that the regulatory
regime might. In addition, these proceedings raise some concerns regarding the source of authority
for U.S. courts to modify their jurisdiction over property of the debtor. See Robert B. Chapman,
Judicial Abstention in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: Recent Protocols in Simultaneous
Plenary Cases, 7 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 1 (1998).
74 See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 742.
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III. U.S. INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW As A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM
A. The Theory of Multilateralism
Although other theories have been proposed to guide choice-of-law think-
ing, the field of conflict of laws has been shaped largely by the opposing
schools of unilateralism and multilateralism. 75 While multilateralism is gener-
ally considered the successor of unilateralism in early choice-of-law develop-
ment,76 the tension between the two approaches has remained relatively con-
stant. Each theory has its adherents, and today's conflicts law includes ele-
ments of both approaches. 77
Unilateralism focuses on the scope of application of a particular rule.78
Faced with a dispute involving an international component, the forum court in-
quires simply whether the law of the forum is applicable. If the court con-
cludes, based on its analysis of the particular rule and its underlying purpose,
that the law of the forum properly applies to the dispute, then it will generally
apply forum law.79 A unilateralist approach thus terminates the choice-of-law
analysis upon finding that forum law is applicable, regardless of whether the
law of other jurisdictions may also apply to the dispute.80
Multilateralism, on the other hand, does not analyze the reach of a par-
ticular rule. Rather, it examines the connection between a legal relationship
and a forum. Faced with an international dispute, the forum court will assess
75 In addition to unilateralism and multilateralism, prevailing approaches to conflicts theory
include substantivism and party expectations. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiv-
ing Constitution, 71 IND. L. J. 271, 271 (1996). As discussed below, the relationship between uni-
versality and territoriality in bankruptcy correlates loosely with the larger conflicts systems of mul-
tilateralism and unilateralism.
76 See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419 (1984); see also
MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE 106-07 (1995).
77 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, for instance, has been described as adopt-
ing an eclectic approach, incorporating both unilateralist and multilateralist elements. See gener-
ally Willis L. M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV.
501 (1983).
78 See Juenger, supra note 76, at 427 (describing the unilateralist approach as "divining the
spatial reach of substantive rules").
79 Many unilateralists, including Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig, adhered to this no-
tion of forum preference. See generally ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 326 (1962). Other unilateralists have attempted to make the approach less forum preferring.
See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and the Use of
that Analysis in Products Liability, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 493, 501-02 (1985); Robert A. Sedlar, Reflec-
tions on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1628, 1630-31 (1981). But see LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 18 (1995) (suggesting that forum preference is the inevitable out-
come of the unilateral approach) and REIMANN, supra note 76, at 108 (reaching the same conclu-
sion).
80 Another way of viewing the approach is to note that unilateralism recognizes the concept
of "concurrent legislative jurisdiction,' since it is not concerned by the possibility that another fo-
rum may simultaneously choose to apply its law to the same dispute. William S. Dodge, Extrater-
ritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 101, 107 (1998).
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the parties and the transaction in an attempt to assign the entire relationship to
a particular place.8 ' The law of the jurisdiction to which the relationship is as-
signed will then be applied to the dispute. Savigny, one of the fathers of the
multilateralist school, described the goal of conflicts analysis as "discover[ing]
for every legal relation (case) that legal territory to which, in its proper nature,
it belongs or is subject (in which it has its seat)." 82 Therefore, unlike the uni-
lateral approach described above, this analysis does not stop with a finding that
forum law may apply: It inquires further whether the relationship in question
has closer ties to another jurisdiction. 83 Because a choice must eventually be
made between two or more competing jurisdictions, the multilateral approach
is often described as jurisdiction-selecting. 84
The primary goals of the multilateralist approach are uniformity of choice-
of-law result and predictability of outcome. In other words, this approach
seeks to prevent forum shopping by ensuring that any court addressing a par-
ticular dispute will assign it to the same jurisdiction. It intends further that the
jurisdiction of assignment will be knowable in advance. 85 To achieve these
goals, multilateralists have developed rules in various areas of the law that are
intended both to shortcut and to make more predictable the jurisdiction selec-
tion analysis conducted by the forum court. For example, a torts dispute would
be assigned to the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred. 86 Such seemingly
straightforward rules simplified the choice-of-law process, increasing the uni-
formity and predictability of the choice-of-law determination.
Because the goal of multilateralism is simply to select the jurisdiction with
which the dispute is most closely linked, the approach is necessarily neutral as
to the substance of the competing laws.87 Occasionally, then, a law will be
chosen whose application would generate an unjust result in a particular case.
In such a situation, while the procedural goals of choice-of-law analysis may
be served by the selection of the proper law, substantive justice would not be
achieved in the particular case. 88 Such an event would necessitate an adjust-
81 See REIMANN, supra note 76, at 106.
82 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (William Guth-
fie trans., 2d ed. 1880). See also FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE
10-27 (1993) [hereinafter MULTISTATE JUSTICE] (describing Savigny's theory).
83 See REIMANN, supra note 76, at 106.
84 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173,
177 (1933).
85 See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 36-40.
86 Lex loci delicti was one of the most enduring multilateral rules. See id. at 37 (noting the
rule's history).
87 See REIMANN, supra note 76, at 110-11 for a discussion of substance neutrality.
88 This distinction is often characterized as the difference between "conflicts justice" and
"substantive justice." See REIMANN, supra note 76, at 160. See also MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra
note 82, at 69.
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ment to the choice-of-law result. 89 The multilateralist approach deals with
such situations primarily through the use of an escape clause mechanism in the
form of a public policy exception. That exception provides that if application
of the law chosen by the relevant conflicts rule would violate the public policy
of the forum state, the court can choose to apply forum law instead.90
Interestingly, unilateralism and multilateralism share an important charac-
teristic: They are both territorial approaches in that the choice-of-law decision
depends on locating the appropriate sovereignty under whose laws the dispute
will be resolved.91 In other words, each utilizes an analysis that does not take
into account the substance of the competing laws, but seeks merely to identify
the appropriate source of law.92 For this reason alone these theories provide a
good lens through which to examine international bankruptcy law, which has
itself remained grounded in concepts of sovereignty and (in the jurisdictional
sense) territoriality.
B. Multilateralism in U.S. International Bankruptcy Law
A multilateral methodology has not been expressly adopted in the area of
international bankruptcy.93 However, the theoretical orientation of the U.S.
approach to international bankruptcies, combined with the doctrine that has
developed under the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code, reveals the
emergence of a multilateralist approach to cross-border insolvency. This Sub-
part sets forth the framework within which international bankruptcies are con-
sidered and then discusses the multilateralist nature of that approach. It argues
that the fundamental structure of U.S. international bankruptcy law, as applied,
fits squarely within the multilateralist tradition. First, the utilization of comity
in Section 304 analysis reveals an assumption that one jurisdiction's claim to
adjudicate the bankruptcy of a given debtor may be superior to another's. Sec-
89 Even Savigny, for instance, recognized that the application of foreign law could not be
used to avoid the application of mandatory law of the forum. See SAVIGNY, supra note 82, at 38.
90 See infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the public policy exception. Critics of multilater-
alism note the development of other devices used by courts to manipulate the choice-of-law deci-
sion. Such devices include characterization (which ensures the application of local law by charac-
terizing a particular issue as procedural rather than substantive) and renvoi (which permits the fo-
rum to apply foreign conflicts law-rather than substantive law-when that conflicts law would in
turn lead back to the choice of the substantive law of the forum). See Cavers, supra note 84, at
182-187.
91 "Territorial" in this context is not to be confused with "territoriality" as a theory of inter-
national bankruptcy law, under which a forum court will automatically apply the law of its own ju-
risdiction.
92 Interest analysis, a unilateralist method, considers the content of potentially applicable law
in that it seeks to locate underlying policies in connection with the choice-of-law decision. But that
analysis is undertaken to decide whether the law is in fact applicable to the particular case, not to
determine what the result of that application will be. See Shreve, supra note 75, at 284.
93 Indeed, as discussed supra at text accompanying notes 45-59, international bankruptcy
law seems to have developed without explicit adoption of any particular choice-of-law method.
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ond, the Section 304 process incorporates a public policy escape clause
mechanism that is used to avoid unfairness in individual cases.
1. The Role of Comity in Choice of Bankruptcy Law
Comity plays little or no role in unilateral analysis, since that approach
does not require courts to choose between forum and foreign law. Comity is in
many ways, however, the foundation of multilateralism. 94 In its traditional in-
carnation, though, comity is not itself a method for choosing applicable law;
rather, it provides a justification for implementing that choice once made.
The classic definition of comity in U.S. jurisprudence defines it as:
neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor of mere
courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or ju-
dicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.95
This definition reveals a tension between international considerations (in-
ternational duty and convenience) and domestic ones (the rights of local citi-
zens). It is primarily this internal conflict that limits the role of comity in its
traditional form. Comity does not itself guide the choice-of-law decision; that
is, it creates no mechanism for balancing the international considerations
against the domestic ones and arriving at a choice between them. But once a
choice-of-law rule has been applied and has pointed to foreign law, comity
provides a justification for courts implementing that result. 96 Thus, in the face
of applicable domestic law, a court may cite international convenience in ap-
plying chosen foreign law to the disadvantage of a local claimant.97 As a basis
for assessing and applying the results of a conflicts method, then,98 comity
supports multilateralist rules governing conflicts of law.99
94 Justice Joseph Story, whose 1834 treatise initiated the multilateralist movement in the
United States, justified the assignment of a dispute to a foreign jurisdiction by reference to princi-
ples of comity-the notion that although a nation has no obligation to recognize within its own
borders the laws or judgments of another, it might nonetheless choose to offer such recognition on
the basis of the mutual interest of nations in an effective international system. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7-8 (reprinted 1972) [hereinafter STORY].
95 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
96 See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'LL. J. 1 (1991).
97 Conversely, the court may cite protection of citizens in justifying its exercise of one of the
escape mechanisms to apply forum law when the choice-of-law rule has led to foreign law.
98 See Paul, supra note 96, at 2-5.
99 Although the traditional formulations of comity contain within them both reasons to defer
to foreign courts and reasons not to defer, the doctrine has been construed largely as an obligation
to defer. See Paul, supra note 96, at 44.
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a. Centrality of Comity in Section 304 Analysis
Even though comity appears in Section 304 merely as one of six guidelines
for domestic courts to consider in deciding whether to defer to a foreign pro-
ceeding, 100 it has become the focal point in determining the law applied in in-
ternational bankruptcies. Far from merely justifying the outcome of a conflict-
of-laws analysis, comity now plays the role of a full-fledged choice-of-law
method.
The legislative history describing the inclusion of comity in the list of Sec-
tion 304 guidelines provides an early indication of the uncertainty that sur-
rounds its role in Section 304 analysis. Neither early drafts of the Section nor
the original House and Senate bills included comity as one of the factors for
courts to consider in resolving cross-border bankruptcies. 01 After debate and
immediately prior to adoption, however, Section 304(c) was modified to in-
clude subsection (5) "to indicate that the court shall be guided by considera-
tions of comity in addition to the other factors specified" in Section 304(c).' 02
Courts and commentators have advanced various interpretations of this last-
minute modification. Some have posited that the status of comity as merely
one of a list of relevant factors indicates that it was not intended to be the focal
point of Section 304(c) analysis, arguing in effect that it had been demoted
from a guiding principle to a single consideration.103 Most, however, believe
that the legislators intended to emphasize the role of comity by ensuring that
comity would be considered not merely as a single factor, but rather as an
overarching policy in any decision whether or not to defer to a foreign pro-
ceeding. 104
The view of comity as the fundamental underpinning of Section 304 analy-
sis is consistent not only with the universalist focus of that section on interna-
tional efficiency and economy,105 but also with pre-1978 treatment of interna-
tional bankruptcies. Prior to the enactment of Section 304, courts framed the
question of whether to defer to a foreign proceeding entirely in terms of com-
100 See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (1994).
101 See REPORT OF COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No.
93-137, pt. 2 (1983). See Stacy Allen Morales & Barbara Ann Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section
304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573,
1586-1588 (1984) and Nadelmann, supra note 10, at 38-41 for a description of the legislative his-
tory of the section.
102 Statement of Representative Don Edwards, 124 CONG. REC. H. 11089, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6442 (emphasis added).
103 See, e.g., In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (" [Ilt
is best to equally consider all of the variables of § 304(c) in determining the appropriate relief in an
ancillary proceeding."); Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 101, at 1588 (" [C]omity is to be consid-
ered in addition to the other section 304 factors on a coequal basis at most.").
104 See Krause et al., supra note 34, at 2594-95; see also In re Axona International Credit &
Commerce, 88 B.R. 597, 608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
105 This focus is reflected in the preamble's focus on "economical and expeditious admiini-
stration of the bankruptcy estate." 11 U.S.C. preamble.
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ity. In one of the earliest instances of deference to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court held that "the true spirit of international comity
requires that schemes of this character, legalized at home, be recognized in
other countries." 106 Decisions not to defer were formulated similarly: "what
property may be removed from a state and subjected to the claims of creditors
of other states is a matter of comity between nations and states." 107 Whatever
the uncertainties surrounding the inclusion of comity in Section 304(c), there is
no indication that the legislature intended to abandon it as a fundamental prin-
ciple guiding analysis in this area.108
Indeed, the adoption of Section 304 seems not to have affected the view of
the majority of courts that comity is the foundation of analysis in international
bankruptcy cases. Many post-1978 decisions have in fact turned on the comity
issue alone.109 Some courts note that the other guidelines stated in Section 304
illustrate some of the factors previously considered under the rubric of comity,
and therefore apply them as a kind of formalized comity test."10 Other courts
either continue to view comity as a general mandate rather than a specific
guideline' or simply ignore the Section 304 guidelines altogether in favor of
a pre-1978 style comity analysis." 2 Even courts that purport to conduct a fac-
tor-by-factor analysis often fail to separate the comity guideline from the other
considerations, thus blending notions of comity with their analysis of the other
factors. 13 In sum, the majority of courts view the question posed by Section
106 Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883).
107 Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908).
108 See Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Servs., 773 F2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1985) ("It is clear that
the drafters ... did not intend to overrule in foreign bankruptcies well-established principles based
on considerations of international comity."). The Commentary to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 seems instead to consider the specific provisions of Section 304 as a means to implement
comity, noting that "principles of international comity... suggest that the court be permitted to
make the appropriate orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being provided
with inflexible rules." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 325 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6281.
109 See Krause et al., supra note 34, at 2609-10.
110 See, e.g., In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that comity is to
be granted "as long as the laws and public policy of the forum state are not violated," and then
stating that "[t]his Court will look to the other relevant factors enumerated in Section 304(c) to de-
termine whether [application of foreign law] would be wicked, immoral, or violate American law
and public policy"). See Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 101, at 1593, for a critical review of this
decision.
111 See, e.g., Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987)
("Under general principles of comity as well as the specific provisions of section 304, federal
courts will recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings provided the foreign laws comport with due
process and fairly treat claims of local creditors.").
112 See, e.g., Triton Container Int'l, Ltd. v. Cinave, S.A., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16075.
113 One court, in comparing the distribution schemes pursuant to the Section 304(c)(4)
guideline, noted that "deference to foreign proceedings is warranted under principles of comity
when they.., provide ... a sure scheme for differentiation between secured and unsecured credi-
tors." In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Allstate Life Insurance v.
Linter Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the court folded into its comity
analysis a consideration of such factors as whether creditors of the same class were treated equally,
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304(c) to be simply whether or not comity should be granted to a foreign bank-
ruptcy proceeding.1 14
b. Evolution of Comity into a Choice-of-Law Rule
As described in Part II.B above, a domestic court in a typical international
bankruptcy case must resolve a contest between a foreign bankruptcy repre-
sentative and a local claimant for assets of the debtor located in the United
States. In such a situation, U.S. law will be applicable,1 5 and the local creditor
will seek to apply it in exercising its rights against assets located in the United
States. Assuming, as is generally the case, that foreign bankruptcy law pur-
ports to reach all assets of the debtor, foreign bankruptcy law will also be ap-
plicable. Thus, the foreign representative will seek to apply that law in ad-
ministering the bankruptcy estate that includes those assets.'1 6 Faced with this
conflict-and lacking actual choice-of-law rules-the majority of courts use
comity as a rule of decision. They hold that comity dictates deferral to a
pending foreign proceeding (in which foreign law will be applied) unless there
is some pressing reason to apply U.S. law instead.1'7 It is in this application
that the expanded role of comity manifests itself. Comity serves not as a justi-
fication for accepting the law chosen by a conflicts rule, but as a conflicts rule
in itself.
This use of comity reveals the multilateralist orientation of the U.S. ap-
proach to international bankruptcies. Although that approach deviates from
traditional multilateralism in using comity as a choice principle rather than as a
basis for accepting the result of application of a choice rule, it is fundamentally
multilateralist in that it seeks to assign the dispute to the proper jurisdiction. In
reading comity as a mandate to defer absent special circumstances, courts as-
sume that comity establishes a presumption in favor of the foreign bankruptcy
proceeding. This, in turn, reveals the fundamental assumption that although
domestic law might apply to issues connected with the insolvency of a foreign
debtor, that insolvency might be more closely linked to another jurisdiction
than it is to the United States. In other words, it reflects the multilateralist un-
derstanding that another jurisdiction might be the more appropriate seat of the
legal relationships constitutive of the bankruptcy case.
Interestingly, although it ultimately permits a territorialist response, the
Reform Act refines the multilateralist assumption revealed in such cases. Un-
whether creditors had the right to appeal denial of claims, and whether creditors' meetings were
provided for.
114 See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Systems Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir.
1987) ("[S]ection 304... expresses Congressional recognition of an American policy favoring
comity for foreign bankruptcy proceedings.").
115 This is because the property is located in the United States and a U.S. creditor is involved.
116 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 119 (1963). In Cur-
fie's terminology, this is a "true conflict."
117 See supra Part I.B.I for a discussion of the connection between choice of forum and
choice of law. See also Given & Vilaplana, supra note 31, at 339 (stating that Section 304 "re-
quire[s] recognition of the foreign law absent a demonstration to the contrary").
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like the current provisions regulating international bankruptcies, 118 the Reform
Act explicitly differentiates between a "foreign main proceeding" and a "for-
eign non-main proceeding." It defines the former as "a foreign proceeding
taking place in the country where the debtor has the center of its main
interests." 119 While a U.S. court may provide certain relief upon recognition
of either type of proceeding,120 the relief that follows recognition of a foreign
main proceeding-including the imposition of the automatic stay provided in
Bankruptcy Code Section 362-is automatic.121 This disparity in treatment re-
flects the Reform Act's underlying presumption that bankruptcy proceedings
initiated in the debtor's home jurisdiction are entitled to a greater degree of
deference than proceedings initiated elsewhere. In explicitly acknowledging,
rather than merely assuming, that there is only one most appropriate forum in
which to adjudicate issues surrounding the bankruptcy of a foreign debtor, the
Reform Act thereby addresses one of the major gaps in the comity-based mul-
tilateralism that has developed under Section 304.122 Its deference to foreign
main proceedings sketches the outlines of a true jurisdiction-selecting rule
based on a notion of the "proper seat" of the insolvency proceeding.123
2. Use of Escape Clauses
As discussed above, multilateral analysis is generally conducted through
the application of fairly strict jurisdiction-selecting rules. Occasionally, the
relevant rule will lead to the selection of a law whose application is simply un-
118 Under the Bankruptcy Code, "foreign proceeding" includes proceedings initiated in the
country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets
are located. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (1994). Because Section 304 does not reserve relief for spe-
cific categories of proceedings falling within that definition, the representative of any such pro-
ceeding-whether a "full" proceeding opened in the home jurisdiction of the debtor or some sort
of secondary or ancillary proceeding opened, for instance, in the home jurisdiction of a creditor-is
entitled to the same treatment in a U.S. court. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
119 Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1502(4). Section 1516(c) establishes the presumption that
the state of the debtor's incorporation is the center of its main interests. See id. § 1516(c). These
definitions were also adopted in the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of
1995, which has been ratified by all members of the European Union other than Great Britain. Ar-
ticle 3 of that Convention provides that the "principal case" may be opened by "courts of the Con-
tracting State within the territory in which the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated." See
Schollmeyer, supra note 1, at 425.
120 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1521.
121 See id. § 1520(a)(1).
122 C.f. Trautman, supra note 45, at 55. The Reform Act also creates a disincentive to the
initiation of multiple proceedings regarding the same debtor, since most of those (all that are
opened in jurisdictions other than that in which the debtor has its center of main interests) will be
entitled only to the reduced relief afforded to "non-main" proceedings. See Gaa & Garzon, supra
note 53, at 276.
123 Again, additional provisions of the Reform Act permit a territorial result despite this uni-
versalist inclination. Section 1520(c) goes on to provide that local bankruptcy proceedings can be
initiated against a foreign debtor even following the recognition of a foreign main proceeding.
While this arrangement does operate as a concession to territoriality, though, it does not undermine
the impact of the initial recognition. See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1520(c).
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fair in the particular case. Faced with an unfair result, a court will search for
ways to deviate from the chosen law and apply local law in its place. Tradi-
tional multilateral analysis employs the public policy exception to accomplish
this task. 124
Public policy takes many forms. In Savigny's formulation, foreign law
cannot be applied to derogate "strictly positive, imperative laws" of the forum
country. 25 Likewise, Story maintained that foreign law would not be applied
when "repugnant to [the] policy" of the forum state.126 The Restatement of
the Law (Second) of Conflict of Laws refers to the "strong public policy of the
forum." 127 However defined, public policy appears in all incarnations of mul-
tilateral rules, in recognition of the need to protect certain interests of the fo-
rum state. 128 In a sense, public policy is merely the flip side of comity: Where
comity is viewed as a reason to accept a choice leading to the application of the
laws of another nation, public policy is viewed as a reason to refuse that
choice, preferring instead to apply the laws of one's own.
As these formulations of the public policy exception indicate, it is at this
stage that a level of substantive review is introduced into the conflicts process.
Once the court locates the "proper seat" for a legal relationship, it will exam-
ine the law of that jurisdiction for potential policy implications. If application
of the law chosen by the conflicts rule would violate the public policy of the
state deferring to it, the court can opt out of that application. 29
For good and for ill, a multilateralist escape mechanism has become an
important part of U.S. international bankruptcy jurisprudence. Although pub-
lic policy is not mentioned by name in Section 304, it has been imported into
Section 304 analysis as a corollary of the comity guideline and has assumed a
level of importance in decisionmaking parallel to that of comity. Just as courts
that choose to defer to foreign proceedings often cite comity alone as the rea-
son for their decisions,130 courts that choose not to defer to these proceedings
124 Note that in other jurisdictions the view of these exceptions might be slightly different.
In civil code countries, for instance, a somewhat more mechanistic approach is favored. Even
there, however, the concept of ordre public serves a similar function. See Paul, supra note 96, at
30-35.
125 SAVIGNY, supra note 82, at 77.
126 STORY, supra note 94, at 37.
127 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
128 Consequently, comity has not traditionally functioned as a choice-of-law rule. It provides
courts with a reason either for a pplying foreign law or for denying such an application in favor of
local law, but it contains no mechanism that aids courts in making the decision.
129 It bears repeating, though, that it is only at this stage that the substance of the chosen law
is reviewed; the first step remains a pure jurisdictional analysis. See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra
note 82, at 79-80 (noting that with few exceptions, scholars have viewed public policy as an ex-
ception to the choice-of-law rule rather than as part of the choice-of-law process itself).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 109-114.
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often cite public policy interests alone. 131 That is, they justify their refusal to
defer by pointing to a violation of public policy rather than by referring to an
analysis of the Section 304(c) factors. 32 The public policy escape device-a
hallmark of multilateral analysis-has thus become an important element of
the U.S. approach to resolving cross-border bankruptcies. The importance of
the escape valve is underscored by its explicit adoption in the Reform Act. 33
Courts in the United States in this way employ a multilateralist approach in
resolving international insolvencies. They acknowledge the applicability of
local law, but through the comity analysis apply a jurisdiction-selecting rule
that recognizes the superior claim of a foreign forum. If the content of the
bankruptcy law that will be applied by that forum is such that its application
seems unjust in the particular case, then domestic courts will search for an ex-
ception that permits them to apply local law instead. 134
IV. THE SUITABILITY OF MULTILATERALISM
Although Congress and the courts may not have consciously structured the
U.S. approach to cross-border bankruptcies as a multilateralist system, multi-
lateralist principles are embedded in Section 304 jurisprudence. But is multi-
lateralism the best choice-of-law methodology to apply to international insol-
vency? This is an important question to ask especially now, when legislative
and judicial developments suggest the beginnings of a shift in the orientation
of our international insolvency approach.135 The answer depends in turn on
two inquiries: (1) whether the advantages of multilateralism are consonant
131 See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1267 (3d Cir.
1987) ("Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be prejudicial to the interest of
the nation called upon to give it effect."); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico,
44 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[A] court may, within its discretion, deny comity to a foreign ju-
dicial act if it finds that the extension of comity 'would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of
the' United States."). Interestingly, courts never adopt the opposite assumption, saying that comity
will only be granted if international convenience so requires.
132 This is the case even when one of the specific Section 304(c) guidelines relates directly to
the particular concern. In Interpool v. M/V Venture Star 102 B.R. 373, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988),
for instance, the court noted that the foreign bankruptcy law did not recognize the doctrine of equi-
table subordination or provide adequate procedural protections. Rather than resting its decision not
to defer on Section 304(c)(4), however, it went on to conclude that applying foreign law would
therefore violate "[b]oth the laws and the public policy of the United States." Id. Other cases have
involved local policies that do seem important enough to outweigh international interests. In Over-
seas Inns v. United States, the "inexpugnable public policy that favors payment of lawfully owed
federal income taxes" was served by a refusal to defer to foreign law. Overseas Inns v. United
States, 911 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1990). In another case, the court refused to defer to certain
debt negotiations in order to protect "the strong interest [of the United States] in ensuring the en-
forceability of valid debts under the principles of contract law." Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco
Popular del Peru, 895 F Supp. 660, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (internal citation omitted).
133 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1506 ("Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from
refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the
public policy of the United States.").
134 See infra Part V.B.2 where I make the argument that the one (improper) exception to this
analytical approach is the preemptive use of Section 304(c)(4).
135 See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of these developments.
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with the goals of international bankruptcy reform; and (2) whether the particu-
lar weaknesses of multilateralism are especially pronounced as that method is
applied to bankruptcy choice of law.
One of the primary justifications for adopting a multilateralist system-a
system that contemplates application of foreign law in situations in which fo-
rum law might also be applied-is that the approach yields uniformity of result
and predictability of outcome.136 In other words, any court considering which
law to apply to a particular case should reach the same result, and that result
should be predictable. These advantages are particularly relevant to the reso-
lution of international bankruptcy proceedings. If domestic creditors know that
a local action (whether a local bankruptcy proceeding or an action to attach a
debtor's assets) will be subordinated to the bankruptcy proceeding initiated in
the debtor's home jurisdiction, they will be less likely to initiate such actions,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the estate will remain intact. 137 In addi-
tion, if creditors are aware in advance of the jurisdiction to which any future
bankruptcy proceeding concerning the debtor will be assigned, they will be
able to enter into their financing arrangements with an appreciation of the
likely results of debtor insolvency. Thus, the goals of multilateralism overlap
well with the goals of international bankruptcy resolution.
The rest of this Part turns to the second aspect of our inquiry, examining
the weaknesses of multilateralism and analyzing whether they are particularly
pronounced when multilateralism is applied to international bankruptcy prob-
lems.
A. The Sacrifice of State Interests in Pursuit of Uniformity
In order to obtain the advantages offered by predictable multilateral rules,
a court must necessarily decide not to apply the law that would further the in-
terests of the state in which it is located-that is, forum law. One of the major
criticisms of the multilateral approach takes exception to this orientation, ar-
guing instead that important state interests should never be sacrificed in the
pursuit of uniformity. 38 This argument contends that an existing and relevant
state policy should simply be effectuated rather than weighed against the inter-
national policy of uniformity.139 In the area of international bankruptcy, how-
ever, certain aspects of the state interests involved detract from this criticism.
136 See supra Part III.A for a description of multilateralism.
137 Preventing dismemberment of the estate is, of course, one of the goals of Section 304 and
the case law thereunder. Many courts have recognized the need to prevent a race to the (local)
courthouse by local creditors seeking an advantage over their foreign counterparts who have been
subjected to a stay. See, e.g., In re Rukavina, 227 B.R. 234, 242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1998); Victrix
S.S. v. Salen Dry Cargo, 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987).
138 See CURRIE, supra note 116, at 181-83.
139 Id.
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1. The Weight of the State Interest Involved
The contention that multilateralism inappropriately diminishes the impor-
tance of state interests has particular currency in the area of extraterritorial
regulation. Certain commentators discussing extraterritoriality, particularly in
the context of antitrust law and securities regulation, argue that the multilater-
alist approach is ill suited to disputes arising in those regulatory areas.140 They
suggest that in the regulatory context, the interest of the state "is of a different
order than the 'interest,' meaning the social policy, underlying the rules of torts
and contracts." 141 They perceive the state as more directly invested in the out-
come of the case, regardless of whether it is actually a party to the dispute,
noting that private plaintiffs act not only on their own behalf but as private at-
torneys general vindicating the interests of the state.142 This argument suggests
that the existence of a regulatory interest should trigger a unilateral ap-
proach.'4 3 Once a regulatory interest of the forum state has been identified,
possible claims to adjudication of the dispute by foreign countries should not
be considered.'" On this view, then, the state interest trumps the competing
goals of comity and international efficiency served by multilateral analysis.
This argument does not apply directly to the field of international bank-
ruptcy. State interests are properly viewed as stronger in regulatory cases be-
cause those cases involve and sometimes determine the rights of the respective
governments themselves.' 45 International insolvency proceedings, however,
do not generally implicate the rights of the United States as a sovereign en-
tity.14 6 Rather, they determine the rights of individual debtors and creditors.147
The rules implemented by the Bankruptcy Code establish a framework for the
determination of private rights, but do not establish the rights of the sovereign
140 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 80.
141 Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws:
An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1799, 1818 (1992).
142 A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 10
(1988) (placing antitrust law, on this basis, in the category of "penal jurisdiction"). See also Har-
old G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 289 (1982).
143 See text accompanying supra notes 78-80 for a discussion of unilateralism and the appli-
cability of forum law.
144 See Dodge, supra note 80, at 151.
145 See Maier, supra note 142, at 289 ("[T]ransnational regulatory cases always decide the
correlative rights of governments.").
146 There are, of course, exceptional cases in which the United States is a party to the bank-
ruptcy proceeding or related litigation. See, e.g., Overseas Inns v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968,
975 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (declining to recognize a foreign bankruptcy decree that adversely affected
the tax claims of the U.S. government).
147 See Maier, supra note 142, at 289 (" [In nonregulatory] cases the issue is which of two or
more conflicting governmental policies shall be applied to private persons, none of whom function-
ally serves as a government surrogate.").
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as such.148 Multilateralist methodology is therefore better suited to the area of
international insolvency proceedings than it may be in the context of antitrust
and securities regulation.
Although this regulatory argument does not apply directly in the case of
bankruptcy, however, it raises the larger question of whether the public law as-
pects of bankruptcy necessitate unilateral analysis. 4 9 As a system with foun-
dations in both private rights and public law, bankruptcy has historically been
considered more than simply a means to resolve private relationships.150 In
decisions regarding international bankruptcies in particular, U.S. courts have
remarked on the public character of bankruptcy. Those courts that have con-
sidered the relationship between the policy of enforcing contractual provisions
and the policies served by our bankruptcy system, for example, have generally
concluded that the public aspect of bankruptcy proceedings limits the freedom
to choose law in contract.1 51 Others have referred in more general terms to the
"public" nature of the bankruptcy proceeding. 152 In the recent litigation in-
volving the bankruptcy of Maxwell Communication Corporation, the court
turned not to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts but to the Restatement
148 [T~he body of case law developed in regulatory areas, particularly regarding antitrust
law, is inapposite to international insolvency analysis. Laws regulating conduct enforced
by government agencies are the expression of sovereign policies. Conflicts among such
bodies of regulatory law are governed by Section 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Re-
lations .... The private disputes that characterize most insolvency cases do not revolve
around compliance legislation, and conflicts of law in this area are governed by private
international law.
6A Norton on Bankruptcy 152:14.
149 The argument for unilateralism in the regulatory arena is based on the public nature of the
state interest involved. If public interests are implicated even in a nonregulatory area, then the ar-
gument favoring unilateralism might be extended to that field.
150 In the landmark case addressing whether Article II of the U.S. Constitution bars Con-
gress from establishing legislative courts to resolve bankruptcy issues, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the distinction between private rights and public rights in bankruptcy. The Court suggested
that many rights to be adjudicated by bankruptcy judges were private rights, noting that "a matter
of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others"' and that "the li-
ability of one individual to another under the law as defined' is a matter of private rights." North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982). The Court recog-
nized, however, the possibility that the general "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations" might be
a public right. Id. at 7 1. In a later case, the Court retreated somewhat from this suggestion, citing
cnticism of the notion that public rights might be implicated. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nord-
berg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
151 For example, in Cunard the public policy behind an efficient distribution of assets world-
wide is seen to outweigh the policy of freedom of contract. See Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Servs.,
773 F.2d 452, 459 (2d Cir. 1985). In another case, the court found that comity outweighed the
choice of venue clause contained in a contract between the plaintiff and the debtor. See Kenner
Prods. Co. v. Societe Fonciere, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479-480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("While such clauses
are prima facie valid, they are not enforceable if such enforcement would be 'unreasonable.' Public
policy [here, the policy of deferrin to foreign bankruptcy proceedings] is a key factor in making a
determination of 'reasonableness.'') (citations omitted). But see Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 29(proposing that choice of insolvency law itself should be subject to contractual agreement).
152 See, e.g., Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987)
(" [D]ifferent concerns bear on a case such as this one, which takes on a public character by virtue
of [the debtor's] insolvency and the institution of the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding."); In re Ru-
kavina, 227 B.R. 234, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1998).
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(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, revealing an assumption that the interna-
tional bankruptcy implicated public law rather than private law issues. 153
Despite this public law character, however, it remains the resolution of pri-
vate rights that is at stake in a bankruptcy proceeding. The involvement of the
United States as sovereign is simply not equivalent to its involvement in regu-
latory areas such as antitrust and securities regulation.154 Therefore, the argu-
ments in favor of unilateralism developed in those fields should not be im-
ported into the international insolvency context.
2. In Bankruptcy, Multilateralism Vindicates a State Interest
The argument that multilateralism improperly sacrifices U.S. interests im-
plicitly assumes that the choice of law is an either/or sort of choice: Either the
interests of the United States will be vindicated, or the interests of a foreign ju-
risdiction will be vindicated. The policies reflected in the Bankruptcy Code's
priority and distribution rules,155 however, are not the only U.S. policies impli-
cated in the choice of bankruptcy law. In enacting Section 304, the legislature
specifically noted the separate, "international" policy of deferring to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings as often as possible. Similarly, Section 1501 of the
Reform Act emphasizes the international policy of cooperating with foreign
courts and facilitating the fair and efficient administration of cross-border
bankruptcies.156 In other words, by deferring to a foreign proceeding, we serve
a general U.S. policy while subordinating a different, "local" policy.157 For
that reason, any suggestion that a multilateral rule choosing foreign law
amounts to a decision not to effectuate applicable U.S. policies is misplaced. 158
153 In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996). C.f Norton,
supra note 148.
154 See Timothy E. Powers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act: A Twenty-
First Century Proposal for International Insolvency Co-Operation, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 10, at 689 ("Insolvency is perceived in most societies as substantially a private law
matter, not one that requires governmental intervention beyond providing local proceedings to set-
tle the affairs of a local debtor or creditor.").
155 For instance, the policy of granting priority to fishermen. See II U.S.C. §507(a) (1994).
156 See Reform Act, supra note 53, §1501(a).
157 Some courts have recognized these two levels of policy, and have spoken of deferral as a
realization of the international interest. See, e.g., Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo, 825 F.2d 709,
714 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to "the public policy of ensuring equitable and orderly distribution of
local assets of a foreign bankrupt"). See also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflict
of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT'L L. J. 71, 77 n. 20 (1990)
(noting the importance of "viewing international values as an aspect of local self-interest").
158 Interestingly, mechanisms used to resolve purely domestic bankruptcies suggest that the
"local" policies that are described in cross-border cases as nearly sacrosanct may in fact be of a
lesser order. In the course of a purely domestic reorganization proceeding, for instance, the inter-
ests of secured creditors can be impaired. The freedom to contract that the Bankruptcy Code pro-
tects by preserving the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy is not complete: The terms of such
contracts may be changed, through the cramdown process, equitable subordination, or otherwise.
That is, those interests are susceptible of being weighed against another domestic interest, the fa-
cilitation of reorganizations. If that is true, it is difficult to construct an argument under which they
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3. Convergence of Domestic Interest with Parallel International Interest
The overarching policies served by our domestic bankruptcy rules-se-
curing equality of distribution to similarly situated creditors and affording the
debtor an opportunity for a fresh start159-are exactly the same as the policies
that are served by a universalist approach, merely transposed to the interna-
tional arena. 160 This parallelism undermines the argument that the pursuit of
uniformity and predictability necessitates sacrificing even the one state interest
(" local" bankruptcy policy) that is not served by deferring to a foreign pro-
ceeding. If adhering to multilateral choice-of-law rules that lead to the appli-
cation of foreign bankruptcy law facilitates equality of distribution to all
creditors, then an important domestic policy has been effectuated. 161
The equation is of course not exactly the same. In a purely domestic pro-
ceeding, all creditors to be benefited by equal distribution are local creditors,
whereas equality of distribution on the international scale may disadvantage
certain local creditors in the course of benefiting the total pool. The question,
then, is whether the fairness considerations that drive our commitment to
equality of treatment are applicable only on the domestic front, or whether they
should be extended to all creditors of the debtor. In a world of transnational fi-
nancing and commercial activity, it would seem difficult to argue in favor of
geographical discrimination.162 The basic concept of a domestic bankruptcy
proceeding-that the rights of some individual creditors may be impaired in
pursuit of the best resolution for all parties involved-would be adhered to on
cannot be weighed against the "international" policy of deferring to foreign proceedings. As the
policy of reorganization can be effectuated over the policy of protecting secured creditors, so too
can the policy reflected in Section 304.
159 See Given & Vilaplana, supra note 31, at 332 (characterizing these policies as the "twin
foundations" of U.S. bankruptcy law). As discussed above, a universality approach is necessary
both to secure equality of treatment of all creditors and to enable the reorganization of a corporate
debtor, two of the underlying policies behind the Bankruptcy Code. This should not be confused
with a different point, which is whether the law of a foreign jurisdiction that does not permit reor-
ganization is consistent with U.S. public policy. This only means to state that, in general, a univer-
sal approach is necessary for reorganization to be a viable possibility.
160 See Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 466 (" [E]quality of distribution is a central
principle of default management in every country .... ). In Germany, this transposition of a do-
mestic policy to the international arena has been made explicit. One commentator notes that "[t]he
principle of crossborder equality of distribution is... part of the German public policy." Scholl-
meyer, supra note 1, at 428.
161 See In re Davis, 191 B.R. 577, 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (" [W]e will facilitate.., an
equitable distribution of assets to all creditors. That ... is consistent with the underlying policy of
equality of distribution of assets to similarly situated creditors, which is promoted in the Bank-
ruptcy Code."). This principle is of course limited by the public policy exception discussed infra
Part IV.B. If the foreign bankruptcy proceeding did not in fact serve this overarching goal of
equality of distribution, it would not be recognized.
162 Professor Westbrook has also made what he calls the "Rough Wash" argument, noting
that domestic creditors who are disadvantaged by application of foreign law in a particular case
may gain in the next bankruptcy, when U.S. law is applied to all creditors. Theory and Pragma-
tism, supra note 2, at 465. Local creditors would in any event be protected against outright dis-
crimination in the foreign proceeding. See discussion infra Part V.B. l.a.
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an international scale in a multilateralist approach to international insolven-
cies. 163
B. The Unpredictability Fostered by Multilateral Rules
The second major argument leveled against multilateralism contends that
the theory has proved unable to achieve its own goal of decisional uniform-
ity.164 Critics point to the escape device-considered by multilateralists to be a
necessary tool permitting courts to apply local laws to avoid an unjust result
under application of the chosen law-as evidence that the multilateral system
fosters uncertainty and unpredictability. 65 These critics maintain that it is im-
possible to contain the application of such an exception, and that, more often
than not, it is invoked simply as a means to further the interests of the fo-
rum. 166 In causing that result, the argument continues, the goals of uniformity
and predictability that are so central to the multilateralist mission are under-
mined.167
If we accept multilateralism as an appropriate theoretical framework for
the resolution of international bankruptcies,168 we must accept the existence of
the public policy exception.169 The question critics might raise is whether, in
163 In Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, No. 84 CIV. 2602, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5030, at *1 (S.D.N.Y 1987), the court approved such a result. After noting that the "cen-
tral theme of bankruptcy proceedings in the United States is 'equality of distribution,"' it con-
cluded that "[e]ven if provisions of [the foreign bankruptcy law] did modify the rights of some
creditors. . . the adoption of provisions having such an effect would be entirely consistent with
legislative and constitutional principles in the United States." Id. at 50, 53. It is also, of course,
consistent with our approach to the outward effects of domestic bankruptcies. Under Sections 502
and 507 of the Bankruptcy Code, the equal distribution contemplated in the Code is extended to all
creditors, wherever located. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
164 See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 73-74.
165 Ernest Lorenzen wrote that the presence of the public policy exception to comity "ought
to have been a warning that there was something the matter with the reasoning upon which the
rules to which it is the exception were supposed to be based." ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED
ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-14 (1947).
166 On this view, the exception is not a tool used to avoid a truly unjust outcome, but an ex-
cuse that courts can resort to in choosing forum law over the foreign law selected through applica-
tion of the mechanical choice-of-law rules. See Cavers, supra note 84, at 183.
167 This function of public policy as a reason not to abide by a multilateralist rule is one of
the primary bases on which unilateralists and other conflicts theorists attack multilateralism. In
discussing the escape devices that are part of multilateralist methodologies, Currie noted that "[t]he
tensions that are induced by imposing such [devices] on a setting of conflict introduce a very seri-
ous element of uncertainty and unpredictability, even if there is fairly general agreement on the
rules themselves." CURRIE, supra note 116, at 181. Other critics of multilateralism have voiced
similar concerns regarding the existence of such fundamentally unregulatable exception clauses.
See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 79-80.
168 1 argue at the beginning of this Part that it is an appropriate theoretical approach, given the
primarily private-right aspect of bankruptcy and the particular goals of international bankruptcy
law.
169 In some sense, criticisms of the exception simply reveal the underlying difference in phi-
losophy between unilateralists and multilateralists. As one commentator has pointed out, the mul-
tilateralist method cannot guarantee complete uniformity, but in aiming for uniformity is more
likely to achieve it than the forum-preference approach. See REIMANN, supra note 76, at 108.
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the field of international bankruptcy in particular, the operation of the escape
clause is particularly difficult to constrain. The greatest difficulties inherent in
a multilateral approach to international bankruptcy arise here. First, bank-
ruptcy questions are difficult to classify and therefore create a danger of unpre-
dictable results stemming from the characterization analysis. Second, bank-
ruptcy provisions inevitably involve policy issues and therefore invite overuse
of the public policy exception. The following Subparts discuss these potential
weaknesses of a multilateral approach to international bankruptcy.
1. Characterization
Many of the obstacles preventing the use of traditional choice-of-law prin-
ciples to resolve cross-border insolvencies are traceable to the peculiar char-
acter of bankruptcy law in general. Because bankruptcy law reorders rights
previously created under and subject to nonbankruptcy law, it implicates di-
verse other legal systems including property law, contract law, and commercial
law.170 In addressing bankruptcy law, early multilateralists grappled with this
problem. Savigny, for example, believed that the priority of creditors should
generally be determined in accordance with the law of the bankruptcy forum.
Acknowledging the "mixed nature" of secured claims, however, he suggested
that the law used to determine the priority of secured creditors be that of the
location of the collateral.171 Story maintained that the law of the bankruptcy
forum should be applied to the disposition of personal property. With respect
to claims secured by real property, however, he argued that the in rem nature of
the security dictated application of local law to the rights of the creditor.1 72
Conflicts theories trade on a number of fixed oppositions (procedure ver-
sus substance, for example, or rights in personam versus rights in rem), and
conflicts rules are most effective when applied to a dispute that can be neatly
characterized.173 The impossibility both of placing bankruptcy proceedings
170 See DALHUISEN, supra note 12, at § 2.01[4], 3-125 (" [B]ankruptcy is both a procedural
and substantive law device, touching in turn on many other parts of the law [such as] personal law,
company law, property law, the law of securities, contract law, and sometimes even criminal and
public law....") Bankruptcy has also been described as a "meta-law" that modifies other
branches of national legal systems. See Balz, supra note 1, at 486 (describing the "hybrid character
of bankruptcy law as both procedural and substantive").
171 See SAVIGNY, supra note 82, at 260-261.
172 See STORY, supra note 94, at 340. Others have noted that certain aspects of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding are in fact quasi in rem. See DALHUISEN, supra note 12, at § 3-102-3.
173 This raises the improper use of characterization as a means of avoiding the choice-of-law
result under a multilateralist rule. The choice of a foreign law is the choice of substantive law. If a
particular issue can be characterized as procedural, however, the forum court might be able to avoid
the choice-of-law result in favor of local law. This distinction is reflected in the Model Interna-
tional Insolvency Cooperation Act, which advocates that in ancillary proceedings the court apply
its own procedural law, while deferring to the substantive insolvency law of the (foreign) jurisdic-
tion in which the primary proceeding is being conducted. See Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson,
Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 351-56
(1993).
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squarely within either the procedural or the substantive category, and of dis-
entangling "pure" bankruptcy issues from those involving other areas of law,
arguably renders traditional choice-of-law paradigms unsuitable for bankruptcy
analysis.174 That is, none of the traditional schemes of classification that have
worked to fit other legal problems into a conflicts framework can be success-
fully imposed on international insolvencies.
2. Public Policy Exception
As discussed above, bankruptcy law occupies a space between the realms
of public rights and private ones. That is, although our bankruptcy rules estab-
lish the rights of individual creditors, they also reflect public policy choices.
Therefore, in examining the application of the public policy exception, the
question arises whether it is possible to separate impairments of creditors' in-
terests that do not violate the public policy of the United States from impair-
ments that do. How might we identify those rights-though at base merely the
private rights of an individual-that represent policies of a more public orien-
tation, and that therefore merit a level of protection exceeding that afforded to
other rights?
Multilateralists have long concerned themselves with the delimitation of
public policy, attempting to develop systematic classifications of policy inter-
ests.175 These attempts to circumscribe the category of policies that would
prevent the application of foreign law have failed, of course, to reduce the con-
cept of public policy to a fixed rule. Indeed, no fixed rule is desirable, since
the function of the exception is to save the forum from having to apply law that
would work an injustice in the particular case. 176 But these efforts recognize
that the more predictable the approach, the greater the odds of achieving uni-
formity of result and therefore the more acceptable a multilateral methodology.
174 See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 10, at 669.
175 Savigny posited two classes of "true" policies: positive, mandatory laws and legal insti-
tutions of a foreign state not recognized in the forum state. See SAVIGNY, supra note 82, at 77-78.
The first class includes policies pertaining primarily to moral issues such as marital laws excluding
polygamy; the second includes policies relating to institutions, such as slavery, that will not be ac-
corded recognition in a foreign jurisdiction that does not observe similar practices. See id. Other
efforts include the attempt to separate ordre public into three categories: ordre public interne, ordre
public international, and ordre public universel. For a discussion of this taxonomy, see David Clif-
ford Burger, Transnational Public Policy as a Factor in Choice of Law Analysis, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 374-387 (1984). Others have argued that the public policy category should
be reserved for fundamental social policies, excluding mere legislative policies reflected in statutes.
See Holly Sprague, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public Policy, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1447, 1450-51 (1986).
The Guide to Enactment notes the separation between "the notion of public policy as it ap-
plies to domestic affairs, and the notion of public policy as it is used in matters of international co-
operation." It suggests that the public policy exception is to be used more restrictively in the latter
context. See Guide to Enactment, supra note 53, at 444.
176 See text accompanying supra notes 88-89.
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Creditor ranking and the distribution of assets are excellent cases with
which to examine this distinction between rights that implicate public policies
and rights that do not. While one overall goal of domestic distribution rules is
to secure equality of distribution to all creditors, the rules governing the order
of distribution of assets permit departures from that goal based on domestic
policy decisions. 77 Under the Bankruptcy Code, for instance, assets are dis-
tributed first to secured creditors,178 then to priority unsecured claimants (in-
cluding administrators of the bankruptcy estate, employees, grain producers
and fishermen, alimony recipients, and governmental entities),179 then to non-
priority unsecured creditors,180 and finally to equity claimants. 181 This broad
order in which assets are distributed to different classes of claims, and the deci-
sions regarding what sort of claimants are put into each of the classes, reflect a
judgment-informed by U.S. policies regarding the underlying claims-of the
relative importance of different groups of claimants. 82 The fact that secured
creditors take ahead of priority and unsecured claimants, for instance, reveals a
desire both to protect contractual arrangements and to foster an efficient fi-
nancing system.183 How, then, should one view these underlying policies when
faced with a foreign bankruptcy proceeding that does not share the same val-
ues?
A foreign bankruptcy system might compare with the U. S. system of dis-
tribution in a number of different ways.
1. It might not share the fundamental goals of the U.S. system.1 84
177 See Jacob S. Ziegel, Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: Is There a Solution?,
39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 793, 796 (1995); see also Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 466 (not-
ing that "every country honors equality of distribution primarily in the breach").
178 See 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1994). Creditors hold secured claims if they have a valid security
interest in particular property of the bankruptcy estate. They are entitled to recover the value of
their allowed claims up to the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
179 See II U.S.C. §§ 726, 507 (1994).
180 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(1994).
181 See id. For a discussion of claim classes and order of priority generally, see Selinda A.
Melnik, Creditor Priorities and Preferences Under United States Bankruptcy Law, in
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES, 225, 271-303 (1992).
182 See John K. Londot, Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy: As-
sessing the International Bar Association's Concordat, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 163, 168 (1996)
(" [Clountries tend to make the rules of distribution reflect public policy choices."); see also Ziegel,
supra note 177, at 796. The bases on which these judgments as to relative importance are made
may vary from case to case, as the decision to accord priority to a certain type of creditor can in-
volve political support as well as independent value judgments. The provision for fishermen, for
instance, has been described as "special interest legislation of the most naked kind." DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 1310 (2d ed.
1990).
183 See Ziegel, supra note 177, at 796.
184 The goal of securing equality of distribution to all creditors is common to virtually all
bankruptcy systems. But the other fundamental goal of U.S. bankruptcy law-permitting the
debtor a fresh start (in the case of a corporate debtor, reorganization)-is not shared by all systems.
See Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that other countries do not share the U.S. "bias toward
reorganization").
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2. It might share the fundamental goals but classify creditor groups differ-
ently. For example, a system might not recognize secured creditors as a sepa-
rate class.
3. It might have the same classes, and rank them in the same order, but in-
clude different claimants within each class. A system might grant priority to
dairy farmers but not to fishermen, for instance, or might classify as unsecured
the holder of a particular type of lien that in the United States would qualify for
secured status.] 85
The question, then, is how the treatment of domestic creditors under these
different configurations would impact the public policies reflected in the corre-
sponding U.S. rules.
Each country's bankruptcy code creates a mechanism intended to distribute
the assets of the debtor in a manner that is fair and consistent with local pol-
icy.186 In this sense, all systems serve the same fundamental role that the U.S.
system does. The overarching U.S. policy behind distribution rules (qualified
equality of distribution to all creditors) might therefore be served by bank-
ruptcy systems that do not in an individual case adopt the same distribution
rules that are embodied in the Bankruptcy Code.187 If a foreign system has in
place provisions intended to achieve those goals, one might argue, we should
be unconcerned with the means it chooses to achieve them.]88 Only if the ap-
plication of a particular foreign law contravenes a public policy of the United
States should a court refuse to effectuate the choice of law resulting from the
selection of jurisdiction. 189
185 Under South African bankruptcy law, for example, as under U.S. bankruptcy law, secured
claims are paid first, followed by "preferent" (priority) claims. However, the priority class is made
up of different claimants: In South Africa, first priority goes to funeral expenses (a category not
recognized in the United States), and certain categories of claimants granted priority in the United
States (e.g., grain producers) are not recognized. See Richard A. Gitlin & Timothy B. DeSieno,
Bankruptcy Laws of South Africa, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283, 293 (1997).
186 I do not address here systems that are procedurally flawed or that are arbitrary in their ap-
plication even with respect to domestic creditors.
187 See supra Part IV.A.3 for a discussion of this convergence of local and international pol-
icy goals.
188 One might consider, by way of analogy, the issue of preventing fraudulent or preferential
transfers. Section 304(c)(3) provides that one of the factors to be considered by a domestic court in
deciding whether or not to defer to a foreign proceeding is whether the bankruptcy law of the for-
eign jurisdiction prevents such transfers. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994). Generally, however, it is
sufficient that the foreign law includes provisions intending to accomplish that goal; it is not neces-
sary that the provisions mirror the approach of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Gee, 53 B.R.
891, 90-04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1985) (noting that the British Companies Act provides protections
similar to those in the Bankruptcy Code); Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational Bank-
ruptcies: The United States Position, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 753 (1986) (" [T]he prereq-
uisite of subsection (c)(3) is met if the law governing the main proceeding provides for the preven-
tion of fraud and preference, even if those provisions do not reach as far as do their United States
counterparts.").
189 See, e.g., Overseas Inns v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
application of foreign law would have implicated the public policy, unrelated to bankruptcy, favor-
ing payment of income taxes).
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The difficulty lies in attempting to create a workable system for distin-
guishing between public policies of the United States and other, "ordinary"
policies reflected in the bankruptcy rules. Consider, for example, a bankruptcy
proceeding conducted under a system that fell into the second category above,
in which the foreign bankruptcy law did not distinguish at all between secured
and unsecured creditors. Application of such a law might be viewed as unac-
ceptable because it violates the fundamental domestic policy choice of pro-
tecting freedom of contract. Because applying that law would require a local
secured creditor to submit its claim for administration in such a system, a U.S.
court might therefore legitimately refuse to defer on the basis of public pol-
icy.190 In contrast, the treatment of a U.S. secured creditor under a system fal-
ling under the third category would not rise to the level of requiring public
policy protection. In that situation, the foreign law does recognize the need to
protect secured creditors, but would simply classify the U.S. creditor differ-
ently than U.S. bankruptcy laws would. 191 Thus, although the individual
creditor would be disadvantaged, application of foreign law would not offend
the public policy of the United States. But this distinction seems artificial.
Whether classified as unsecured because foreign bankruptcy law does not rec-
ognize secured creditors as a separate class, or because that law does not rec-
ognize the particular claim in question as secured, the result for the creditor is
the same. 192 At any of these levels, then, public policies are arguably impli-
cated. The impossibility of creating a useful taxonomy of interests presents the
greatest challenge to a multilateral system. 93
V. USING MULTILATERALISM IN THE SERVICE OF UNIVERSALITY
Part IV set forth in the language of traditional conflicts methodology the
particular challenges that international insolvency presents for multilateral
analysis. In that our current regime for resolving cross-border bankruptcies is
in fact a multilateral system, these are of course also the challenges that many
argue have caused the failure of universality. But recasting these problems as
explicit choice-of-law questions permits us to attack them from a new direc-
tion. We can sharpen the choice-of-law approach that is currently hidden in
190 See In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Deference to foreign pro-
ceedings is warranted under principles of comity when they provide, inter alia, a sure scheme for
differentiation between secured and unsecured creditors, whether or not the terms are uniform with
those of the Code .... However, a system that does not clearly distinguish at all is suspect.")
191 See In re Toga, 28 B.R. 165, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to defer to a foreign
proceeding in which a local creditor was recognized as holding a secured claim under U.S. law but
would be an "ordinary" (unsecured) creditor under foreign law).
192 In addition, one might query whether a U.S. court faced with such a creditor would be
willing to engage in this rather fine analytical line drawing.
193 Simplification of the judicial task is of course another choice-of-law goal, and complex
policy escape clauses detract significantly from the simplicity of analysis.
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Section 304 jurisprudence, using overtly multilateralist methodology to attain
the shared goals of multilateralism and universality.
A. Use a Stricter Jurisdiction-Selecting Rule
Multilateral analysis yields benefits only when the jurisdiction-selecting
rule used for a particular type of dispute is predictable and uniformly applied.
To use Savigny's formulation, it must be knowable in advance to which juris-
diction a particular type of legal relationship will be assigned.1 94 The rules
governing jurisdiction selection need not be completely inflexible. In the area
of torts, for instance, the strict rule that the law of the jurisdiction in which the
tort occurred (lexfori delicti) must apply has, as the Restatement (Second) re-
flects, given way to the more flexible principle that the law of the jurisdiction
that "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties"
should apply.195 Furthermore, as discussed above, the application of the law so
chosen may in certain circumstances be waived if substantive justice would not
be served by that application.196 But the stricter the initial rule of selection and
the more predictable its application, the more likely it is that decisional uni-
formity will be achieved.
In seeking to develop such a rule for application to cross-border bankrupt-
cies, we must first define precisely the legal relationship whose seat we seek to
identify. Is it a single, overarching process of resolving the business of the
debtor? In that case, assigning it to a single jurisdiction seems to be a sensible
solution. It recognizes the collective nature of a bankruptcy proceeding, with
its corollary that every action taken to impact the position of one creditor will
necessarily impact the positions of others, and searches for an integrated solu-
tion. 197 On the other hand, if the bankruptcy process is viewed as the resolu-
tion of a disaggregated series of individual debtor-creditor relationships, then
each creditor might argue for the application of local law (assigning each indi-
vidual relationship to the jurisdiction in which that relationship was created).
Returning to the example of priorities, for instance, one might argue that the
priority of each creditor is determined only in relation to other creditors, 198 and
194 See generally SAVIGNY, supra note 82.
195 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND), supra note 127, § 145(1).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
197 An analogy to this framework can be found in the resolution of mass tort disputes. Mass
torts present similar pool problems and similar issues of collective action as contrasted with the
rights of individual litigants. As in the international insolvency area, judges and commentators
considering mass torts have had difficulty formulating coherent choice-of-law approaches. See
generally Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129 (1989).
198 That is, assigning heightened priority to one creditor necessarily decreases the priority
level of others. The rules under which trustees in bankruptcy may avoid certain prebankruptcy
transactions operate similarly: The avoidance of any single transaction will affect not only the re-
lationship between the debtor and the creditor whose interest was avoided, but the position of all
other creditors as well.
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therefore that all questions of priority should be considered within a unified
proceeding. On the other hand, because the legal relationship that creates the
basis for a priority designation (for example, entering into a contract for a se-
curity interest in a piece of land) is an individual matter governed by local law,
one might suggest that each priority question should be considered pursuant to
the relevant local law.
In the United States, bankruptcy is structured as a collective proceeding. 199
Therefore, it seems justifiable-and certainly consonant with the goal of
equality of treatment-to view the entire bankruptcy as a single legal relation-
ship and assign it to a single jurisdiction.
No jurisdiction-selecting rule has been established to date for application
in international bankruptcy proceedings initiated in U.S. courts.200 Instead, the
comity doctrine, which has served as the only conflicts rule in this area, 201 has
been supplemented by certain assumptions regarding the appropriate jurisdic-
tion in which to conduct a bankruptcy proceeding. Historically, the jurisdiction
of incorporation has been considered the most predictable jurisdiction. In
other words, U.S. courts have suggested that creditors should expect that the
law of the debtor's jurisdiction of incorporation might apply should the debtor
enter bankruptcy. The Supreme Court laid the foundations for this analysis in
Gebhard, an 1883 case in which it held that domestic creditors, in doing busi-
ness with a Canadian corporation, subjected their contracts with the debtor to
the bankruptcy laws of Canada.202 This approach is reflected in much of the
case law in this area, and seems to support the view that the "legal home" of
the debtor is considered by U.S. courts to be a reasonable and predictable ju-
risdiction whose laws may be applied even to the detriment of creditors. 203
In distinguishing between "main" and "non-main" proceedings, 204 the
Reform Act takes one step further toward establishing a jurisdictional rule. By
199 This is consistent with the analysis of many courts addressing international bankruptcy
cases, who recognize that any action taken on behalf of local creditors will necessarily affect all
other creditors with an interest in the proceedings. See, e.g., In re Rukavina, 227 B.R. 234, 243
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
200 By contrast, the newly adopted European Union Convention does seek to implement a set
of fixed choice of law rules.
201 See supra Part III.B. .b for a discussion of comity's role as a conflicts principle.
202 See Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883). The Gebhard Court stated the fol-
lowing:
[Elvery person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such
laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation
with which he voluntarily contracts .... To all intents and purposes, he submits his con-
tract with the corporation to such a policy of the foreign government ....
Id. at 537-38.
203 See, e.g., Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(noting that the local creditor "voluntarily associated himself' with the Canadian debtor corpora-
tion). "Legal home" in the sense used in Gebhard of course means the jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion. As discussed above, commentators have observed that this is not the only conceivable choice.
204 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1502(4), (5).
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reserving the highest recognition-and the substantive relief that accompanies
that recognition-for bankruptcy proceedings initiated in the country in which
the debtor has its center of main interests,2 05 the Reform Act identifies that ju-
risdiction as the proper seat for the legal relationship that is to be resolved by
the bankruptcy. The question remains how strict that rule might become in the
service of uniformity. Other provisions of the Reform Act moderate the juris-
diction-selecting effect of Section 1502 substantially. Section 1528 provides
that the opening of even a foreign main proceeding does not prevent a local
proceeding from being opened in the United States. 206 Section 1529 then es-
tablishes the primacy of any such local proceeding over a foreign proceed-
ing, 207 thereby potentially canceling the automatic effects of recognizing the
foreign proceeding.208 These provisions prevent what might be characterized
as a jurisdiction preference in the Reform Act from operating as a true juris-
diction-selecting rule, and vitiate the measure of predictability and uniformity
that Section 1502 might otherwise have afforded. To realize the full potential
of that provision as a multilateralist rule, the Reform Act would have to adopt a
more overtly universality-based approach by restricting the effect of local pro-
ceedings once a bankruptcy in the jurisdiction of the debtor's center of main
interests had been initiated.209  In other words, the jurisdiction-selecting
mechanism introduced by the Reform Act would have to be one that brought
real consequences; not an invitation to make an ad-hoc decision to grant or to
withhold comity, but an assignment of the legal relationships composing the
bankruptcy proceeding to a particular forum.
Obviously, a jurisdiction-selecting rule only works if it leads to the most
appropriate jurisdiction. Ideally, such a rule will be predictable, nonmanipula-
ble and fair. A jurisdiction of incorporation test, for instance, is highly predict-
205 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1520. See text accompanying supra notes 120-121 for
a discussion of the different forms of relief available in "main" and "non-main" proceedings.
206 Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1528. The only requirement is that the debtor must have
assets located in the United States. There is no restriction at all on the opening of local proceedings
before the foreign proceeding is recognized. See Berends, supra note 53, at 383. In contrast to this
approach, the European Union Convention provides that local proceedings can be opened only in
jusdictions in which the debtor maintains an establishment. See Schollmeyer, supra note 1, at
426.
207 In addressing the situation in which the foreign main proceeding has already been recog-
nized, and a local proceeding is opened, Section 1529(2) provides that "any relief in effect under
sections 1519 or 1521 shall be reviewed by the court and shall be modified or terminated if incon-
sistent with the case in the United States," such relief including, if the foreign proceeding is a main
proceeding, the automatic stay. Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1529(2)(A). This provision in effect
refers the court back to pre-Reform Act analysis: If the sorts of considerations included in the Sec-
tion 304(c) guidelines suggest that the court should defer to the foreign proceeding, it may do so;
otherwise, it may permit the local proceeding to continue.
208 It is in these provisions that the Reform Act reveals itself as primarily a procedural rather
than a substantive mechanism. It simplifies the process by which the representative of a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding may obtain recognition in and assistance of courts in the United States, but
does not prevent those courts from choosing a territorial approach to the resolution of the debtor-
creditor relationships themselves.
209 As discussed supra Part IV.B, this analysis would still be subject to the implementation of
the public policy exception.
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able but somewhat manipulable in that a debtor could reincorporate in a new
jurisdiction.2 10 In addition, it may not be particularly fair, since in the case of
offshore registration the location of incorporation may have little connection
with the business or interests of the company. In other proposed treaties and
conventions dealing with international insolvencies, alternative rules of selec-
tion have been put forward. These have included selection of the location in
which the preponderance of the debtor's assets are located,21' the center of the
debtor's main interests,212 and any location with which the debtor has sufficient
contacts. 21 3
The Reform Act adopts the "center of main interests" test,214 rather than
using place of incorporation, and then creates a rebuttable presumption that the
place of incorporation is the center of main interests. By making the presump-
tion rebuttable, this rule sacrifices a measure of predictability in favor of fair-
ness. 215 Nonetheless, the architects of the Model Law incorporated in the Re-
form Act, as well as most commentators, believe that in most cases the center
of a debtor's main interests will be evident.2 16 In establishing a single criterion
for identifying the main proceeding, this rule will foreclose competing recog-
nition claims by representatives of multiple proceedings and increase the uni-
formity and predictability of choice of bankruptcy forum. 217
210 Of course, creditors could include in their financing documents a covenant preventing
such an action.
211 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the Euro-
pean Common Market, the United States and Canada, 27 McGILL L.J. 541, 551 (1982) (discussing
the draft bankruptcy convention between the United States and Canada).
212 See European Union Convention, art. 3. Article 3 provides further that the location of the
debtor's registered office will be presumed to be the center of its main interests. See Schollmeyer,
supra note 1, at 426.
213 See Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (Int'l Bar Ass'n 1989) reprinted in
John A. Barret & Timothy E. Powers, Proposal for Consultative Draft of Model Insolvency Co-
Operation Act for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or Without Modification, 17 INT' Bus. L.
323 (1989). The Official Comment to the Act suggests that jurisdiction should be determined
based on "greater contacts with the debtor and its estate." See Powers, supra note 154, at 696.
214 Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1502(4). This language was adop ted from the European
Union Convention, in which it was chosen partly because "no better definition could be agreed
upon." Berends, supra note 53, at 330.
215 While this test attempts to achieve fairness while retaining predictability, critics may sug-
gest that it fails with respect to the latter. If the headquarters of a debtor corporation and its regis-
tered office are in Country A, but substantially all of its assets and operations are in Country B, is
the presumption in favor of Country A overcome? Would the outcome be different if the corpora-
tion s assets and operations were evenly distributed between Countries B and C? See MARTIN N.
FLIcs & MICHAEL J. IRELAND, BANKRUPTCY AND THE PROBLEMS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
WORKOUTS 280 (1991) for a discussion of similar fact patterns. As the operations of multinational
corporations become increasingly international, critics argue, these classification difficulties will
multiply.
216 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 12. But see LoPucki, supra note 3, at 713 (criti-
cizing this assumption).
217 See Berends, supra note 53, at 330.
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B. Adopt a More Restrictive Approach to the Policy Exception
In keeping with its nature as a discretionary tool for courts to use in alter-
ing the outcome of a choice-of-law analysis, there is no fixed definition of
public policy governing application of the exception. On one point, however,
there is general agreement: A restrictive approach is desirable if the full bene-
fits of multilateralism are to be attained.218 Both the case law and the legisla-
tive efforts in the international bankruptcy field reflect this desire to apply the
public policy exception narrowly. The formulation of public policy that has
achieved the most currency in Section 304 cases limits the application of the
exception to "a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral,
and shocking to the prevailing moral sense." 219 The UNCITRAL working
group referred to "exceptional circumstances" in discussing the situations in
which such an exception would arise, and drafted a public policy exception
that applies only when the foreign law chosen is "manifestly" contrary to the
policy of the enacting state.220 Such qualifying phrases, however, are not self-
implementing. Under the Reform Act, for instance, a court retains discretion
to identify the appropriate policy of the forum and then to decide whether a
particular aspect of a foreign proceeding is sufficiently contrary to that policy
to preclude its application. Even given the mandate to apply the exception
clause sparingly, courts will still need guidelines to aid them in confining their
use of the exception.
The stage of the international bankruptcy proceeding in which the public
policy exception is most likely to be considered is at the distribution of assets.
Questions of creditor ranking and, more specifically, of the establishment of
priorities provide an excellent basis for discussing choice-of-law issues for two
reasons. First, distribution issues present a relatively straightforward choice:
Either the law of the jurisdiction in which the (main) foreign proceeding takes
place is applied, or the local forum applies its own distribution rules for the
218 The Restatement (Second) reflects this basic understanding in its use of the phrase
"strong public policy" in the recognition of judgments section. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 127, § 117 (emphasis added). The Comment to that section notes that "enforcement will usu-
ally be accorded the judgment except in situations where the original claim is repugnant to funda-
mental notions of what is decent and just" in the enforcing state. Id.
219 Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (1979) (citing Interconti-
nental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1964)). One might question whether this
formulation is actually useful in international bankruptcy cases, where little rises to the level of in-
herent viciousness. But see Story's description of a past bankruptcy practice: "[T]hat terrible
power (if it ever really existed) under the law of the Twelve Tables, which enabled creditors to cut
their debtor's body into pieces, and divide it among them[.]" STORY, supra note 94, at 34. The
sense that commercial transactions do not &enerally implicate issues of morality has led some
commentators to suggest that the public policy doctrine may not be applicable at all in areas of
commercial law (as opposed to family law, for example). See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & ERIK
JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. II SPECIAL PART 82 (1973).
220 Guide to Enactment, note 53, at 444 (discussing Article 6 of the Model Law). For an ar-
gument that thepublic policy exception should be reserved to protect "fundamental principles of
aw," see Berends, supra note 53, at 336. The Guide to Enactment itself contemplates only "rare"
invocation of the exception. See id.
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benefit of local creditors.221 Second, the establishment of different priority
schemes in bankruptcy systems directly forces consideration of a country's
public policy.
Priorities are of course an exception to the overall mandate of equality of
distribution among creditors, and therefore reflect policy choices favoring cer-
tain groups over others.222 While most countries rank administrative expenses
and employees' claims relatively high, for example, the exact rank of those
preferred classes may vary from country to country. When asked to subject the
claims of local creditors to a foreign proceeding that will apply distribution
rules reflecting the policy choices of another nation, it is not surprising that
courts seek to ensure that local creditors retain the benefit of their home coun-
try's ranking.223 The concern for multilateralists is whether this protectionism
might prompt courts to overuse the public policy exception by considering
comparative rankings as a public policy issue. Such an expanded application
of the exception would undermine the predictability of outcome. The question,
then, is whether despite the malleability of the exception we can nevertheless
confine its application in international bankruptcy cases.
1. Basic Rule: Primary Bankruptcy Court Should Apply to All Creditors-
Foreign and Domestic- its Own Bankruptcy Law, Including Provisions
Regarding Ranking and Distribution
This is partly a restatement of current practice, pursuant to which courts do
apply the priority rules of their own jurisdictions, and partly a statement of
nondiscrimination. It is intended to reserve the public policy exception for use
where application of local law is critical.
a. No Procedural Discrimination against Foreign Creditors
Procedural discrimination is primarily a matter of bankruptcy administra-
tion. It is addressed by Section 304(c)(2), which states that in deciding
whether to defer, a U.S. court should consider whether domestic creditors
would be subjected to procedural unfairness or overt discrimination in the for-
221 See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 10, at 659. The "hotchpot" rules, under which a
creditor who has received payment in one proceeding must count that distribution toward his share
in any other proceeding, establish a limited exception to this principle. See id.
222 See Ziegel, supra note 177, at 796. As Ziegel points out, these policy choices may be
based on peculiarly local concessions reflecting the political power of certain creditor groups.
223 See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 10, at 658-659 ("Nothing is more central to the
difficulty of international insolvency co-operation than the greatly differing priorities of various ju-
risdictions. (The constant is the insistence of each government upon preferring itself to most oth-
ers.)").
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eign bankruptcy proceeding. 224 Such discrimination would arise, for instance,
if the foreign bankruptcy court accepted only the filings of local creditors. 225
Under any choice-of-law approach, a court would be justified in choosing not
to defer to a foreign proceeding on such terms.226 The application of a foreign
bankruptcy law that raises procedural bars against the claims of foreign credi-
tors is not the same as application of a foreign law whose substance is different
from U.S. bankruptcy law. A system that does not permit foreign creditors to
register claims with the bankruptcy court reflects simple prejudice against
nonlocal claims.227 This classification thus reflects not national policy, but
rather discrimination exercised only in the context of international bankrupt-
cies. It should therefore be set aside from true policy questions informing the
structure of priorities. 228
b. No Substantive Discrimination against Foreign Creditors
Substantive discrimination, on the other hand, occurs at the distribution
stage of the proceeding. A distribution scheme might provide that all claims,
foreign and domestic, be lodged with the trustee, but that all foreign creditors,
regardless of the substance of their claims, be assigned a priority level below
that of local creditors. 229 Under a nondiscriminatory scheme, by contrast, the
distribution rules of the jurisdiction in which the debtor has its center of assets
would be applied to all creditors in a nationality-blind manner.
The Reform Act prevents substantive discrimination of this sort only to a
point. Although it establishes the basic principle that similar claims of all
224 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (1994). In referring to the sufficient protection of the interests of
U.S. creditors, the Reform Act too permits a court to deny relief to a foreign representative under
these circumstances. See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1521(b).
225 See, for example, In re Axona, 88 B.R. 597, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), in which the
court inquired whether Hong Kong law would permit creditors residing outside Hong Kong to
submit their proofs of claim. Procedural unfairness might likewise result if the rules of the foreign
court did not provide that adequate notice be given to nonlocal creditors. See, e.g., In re Hourani,
180 B.R. 58, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
226 It is best to handle this kind of discrimination as a matter separate from policy concerns.
Many courts, however, have imported these procedural concerns into their substantive policy
analysis, with the intentional or unintentional result of broadening the application of the public
policy exception. In Hourani, for instance, the court engaged in a factor-by-factor analysis of the
Section 304(c) guidelines. In the section devoted to a consideration of the comity factor, however,
it returned to issues of procedural fairness, concluding that comity should not be granted to Jorda-
nian proceedings that did not promise procedural fairness. In effect, it thus considered the same
factor twice. See In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 67-70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
227 See Londot, supra note 182, at 166. See also KURT H. NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 284 (1972) for a description of rules that provide that no foreign
claims will be considered until all local creditors have been satisfied in full.
228 But see Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Observations on Fairness, Public Policy, and Reci-
procity in Cross-Border Insolvencies, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 677, 682
("Favouritism based upon geography is no more objectionable than other instances of special
treatment currently found in our bankruptcy law").
229 In Argentina, for example, local creditors automatically receive priority over foreign
creditors in certain circumstances. See FLICS & IRELAND, supra note 215, at 424.
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creditors shall have the same ranking,230 it recognizes the validity of discrimi-
natory ranking so long as claims of foreign creditors retain at least general un-
secured status.231 A better rule would afford all creditors within any given
creditor class, whether foreign or domestic, the same priority.232
2. No Prospective Substantive Analysis
Section 304(c)(4) requires that the distribution contemplated by the foreign
proceeding must be substantially similar to a distribution conducted in accor-
dance with U.S. distribution rules. 233 Because courts tend to view Section
304(c)(4) as a gating factor rather than as one of several factors to be consid-
ered in balance,234 this analysis invites an abstract comparison of the compet-
ing legal systems without considering whether the interests of a local credi-
tor-let alone an important U.S. policy interest-will in fact be harmed by its
application. In the 1988 Interpool litigation, the liquidator in an Australian
bankruptcy proceeding moved to dismiss involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings that had been filed against the debtor in the United States. 235 The
court was troubled by the fact that Australian bankruptcy law did not allow for
the remedy of equitable subordination. 236 It was not clear, however, that the
local creditor would have had recourse to that remedy even in a U.S. bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 237 In other words, the court did not establish that applica-
tion of Australian law in the case would in fact have raised policy concerns.
230 See Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1513(a); see also Model Law, supra note 53, at art.
13(1).
231 Reform Act, supra note 53, § 1513(b). See also Model Law, supra note 53, at art. 13(2).
The comments to that section note that the article "leaves intact the provisions on the ranking of
claims in insolvency proceedings, including any provisions that might assign a special ranking to
claims of foreign creditors." Guide to Enactment, supra note 53, at450.
232 The public policy exception would remain available to avoid the rare unjust result. For a
suggested model of "cross-priority" in international insolvencies, see Universal Priorities, supra
note 9, at 27. Westbrook points out that such a system would "lessen national discrimination while
increasing discrimination among classes of creditors." Id. at 31. But discrimination among credi-
tor classes is precisely the point of distribution rules and therefore a legitimate result of application
of a particular country's bankruptcy law, whereas "national discrimination" is an exercise in ille-
gitimate distinctions among creditors that further no policy other than territorialism. See also Pat-
rick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other Liens in International
Bankruptcies, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 181 (1998) (arguing that all courts seek in any event is rea-
sonable protection for secured creditors and equality of distribution, at least among distinct classes
of creditors).
233 See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (1994).
234 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
235 See Interpool v. M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988).
236 Id. at 378. Hourani, too, discussed the unavailability of equitable subordination without
considering its potential for application in the specific case. See In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 67-68
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
237 Interpool v. MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) ("While I do not
hold that equitable subordination should be invoked in this case since the substantive issue was not
argued before this Court, a trustee in Bankruptcy must consider this issue.... The lack
of... substantive redress... could significantly affect creditors' rights.") (emphasis added).
36:23
2000 Rethinking International Insolvency
The court thus used an unrealized policy problem as an element of its choice-
of-law analysis. Without examining whether application of foreign bankruptcy
law in a particular case would actually violate U.S. public policy, the court de-
termined simply that the structure of Australian bankruptcy law as a whole was
inconsistent with U.S. policy.
This sort of prospective analysis is wholly inconsistent with traditional
multilateralist methods, in which the choice of law is made before the sub-
stance of that law is inspected for policy problems. The use of Section
304(c)(4) as a mechanism for screening legal systems that seem too different
from our own preempts that stage of the analysis. It substitutes a prospective
comparison of laws for an analysis of whether an escape device such as the
public policy exception should be used in the particular case. Especially be-
cause there is no choice-of-law principle calling for the weighting of Section
304(c) factors, reliance on Section 304(c)(4) amounts to an abstract condition
of similarity. If the distribution rules implemented in the foreign bankruptcy
proceeding are substantially different from the rules implemented by the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the court may deny recognition of the foreign proceeding whether
or not the differences would work to the disadvantage of a local creditor.238 A
more principled approach would adhere to multilateralism's focus on neutral
territorial factors, independent of the content of the chosen law. It should be
assumed that the law of the jurisdiction selected pursuant to the Reform Act
will apply unless application of that law in the particular case would violate
public policy. Under a true multilateralist approach, there is no need for a sub-
stantial similarity condition independent of the public policy exception.
The Reform Act refers to the substantial similarity condition only in con-
nection with the granting of relief beyond that otherwise contemplated by the
Act. 239 In deciding whether the interests of local creditors will be sufficiently
protected in a foreign proceeding, however, a U.S. court is likely to consider
that condition unless explicitly instructed not to do so. 240 Indeed, local credi-
tors will certainly argue that their claims are sufficiently protected only when
the distribution rules applied to them in the foreign proceeding are as favorable
as those that would have been applied in a domestic one. This argument will
238 This approach may have derived in part from the practice that developed under the origi-
nal Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which suggested that courts were permitted to reject foreign
law on the basis of a "great difference" between the foreign law and forum law. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). The Restatement (Second), however, expressly
adopted a narrower version of the escape clause: In discussing enforcement of foreign judgments,
for instance, Comment c to Section 117 notes that "enforcement will usually be accorded the
judgment except in situations where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what
is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
127, § 117 cmt. c.
239 See Reform Act, supra note 53 § 1507(b)(4).
240 See text accompanying supra note 63 for a discussion of the point at which the Reform
Act necessitates a Section 304-style analysis.
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lead directly to the substantial similarity analysis, and therefore away from a
truly multilateralist approach.
3. No Protection of Individual Rights as Opposed to Public Policy
In his formulation of the general principle of comity, Story writes that it is
"inadmissible, when it is contrary to [the granting nation's] known policy, or
prejudicial to its interests." 241 While acknowledging the importance of state
interests, his description of the then-prevailing U.S. approach to international
bankruptcies also refers to the interests of individual citizens. He notes that
"comity requires us to give effect to such assignments only so far, as may be
done without impairing the remedies, or lessening the securities, which our
laws have provided for our own citizens." 242 The Supreme Court's classic
formulation of comity also recognized the balance between "international duty
and convenience, and [the] rights of [the granting nation's] own citizens." 243
Interpreted literally, these formulas suggest that there are two distinct justifica-
tions for withholding comity: a violation of the public policy of the state, and
any impairment, regardless of whether a public policy is implicated, of the
rights of a citizen of that state.
Decisions in the international insolvency cases reflect this duality. Some
cases frame the decision whether to grant comity in terms of national interests
alone,244 while others refer to the rights of particular domestic claimants. 245
Although courts have demonstrated a tendency to defer to foreign proceedings,
often in the face of vigorous protest by local creditors, they tend to frame their
241 STORY, supra note 94, at 37.
242 Id. at 348.
243 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1895). See also Krause et aL, supra note 34, at
2592.
244 See, for example, Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, 44 E3d 187
(3d Cir. 1994), in which the court noted the following:
[W]e have stated that 'comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be
contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.' Thus, a
court may, within its discretion, deny comity to a foreign judicial act if it finds that the
extension of comity 'would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the' United States.
44 F.3d 187, 192 (citing Somportex Ltd. V. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971)).
245 See, e.g., Triton Container Int'l, Ltd. v. Cinave, S.A., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16075
(1997) (citing Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Services, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985)) ("Comity
will be granted to the decision or judgment of a foreign court if... the laws and public policy of
the foreign state and the rights of its residents will not be violated."). See also Victrix S.S. Co.,
S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 65 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Before the court extends
such deference to the foreign proceeding, it must first satisfy itself that forum creditors will be pro-
tected."); Clarkson v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that comity will be
granted as long as "the foreign proceeding has not resulted in injustice to New York citizens, preju-
dice to creditors' New York statutory remedies, or violation of the laws or public policy of the
state").
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public policy considerations in terms of protecting individual creditors. 246 The
courts do not always use these principles consistently. In Philadelphia Gear,
for instance, the court framed the issue before it as whether according comity
to bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico would be prejudicial to the interests of
the United States. 247 In listing factors for the district court to consider on re-
mand, however, it included not only whether a stay imposed by the Mexican
court would violate U.S. public policy, but "whether [the local creditor] will be
prejudiced by the stay." 248
The orientation chosen is particularly important in the area of priorities.
While protecting a national interest would suggest that comity can be granted
so long as the overarching goals of our bankruptcy system are not undermined,
protecting the interest of an individual creditor would dictate the application of
U.S. law whenever necessary to protect that creditor's particular rank in distri-
bution. It is the latter orientation that has caused some courts to adopt a territo-
rial, outcome-oriented approach to international bankruptcies. This analysis
conflates U.S. interests, as reflected in the bankruptcy rules, with the interest of
a particular creditor in obtaining a particular priority classification, and raises
the interest of an individual creditor to higher status as if it alone were a mani-
festation of national policy.
It would be more consistent with the goals of comity and of multilateralism
to apply the public policy exception only when a national public policy is actu-
ally violated. A violation can of course involve the impairment of an individ-
ual creditor's rights, so long as that impairment also implicates a public policy.
But an impairment that causes no actual violation of public policy should not
trigger the application of local law in the face of international concerns. For
instance, if foreign bankruptcy law would grant heightened priority to em-
ployee creditors, thereby effectuating the policy goal of U.S. law, but would
nonetheless yield a smaller distribution to U.S. employees than what would be
available under the Bankruptcy Code, a U.S. employee creditor should not
prevail merely because his specific interest-in the form of a higher bank-
ruptcy dividend-was not protected.
Withholding from courts the discretion to refuse comity in certain situa-
tions in which the application of foreign law might harm U.S. citizens does ef-
fect a change in the traditional application of comity to cross-border bank-
ruptcy issues.249 The change is, however, consistent with other adaptations
246 See, e.g., Disconto v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 579 (1908) ("All civilized nations have rec-
ognized and enforced the doctrine that international comity does not require the enforcement of
judgments in such wise as to prejudice the rights of local creditors and the superior claims of such
creditors to assert and enforce demands against property within the local jurisdiction.")
247 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194.
248 Id.
249 See Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 101, at 1587 for a discussion of the legislative deci-
sion not to overturn the "general American rule of conflict of laws" that local creditors had a
paramount right to levy on local assets.
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that have been made to the use of comity in that context.250 More importantly,
it will allow the full benefit of the jurisdiction-selecting rule that is currently
only implicit in U.S. international bankruptcy jurisprudence to be realized, by
limiting the situations in which an escape clause could be used.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY LAW
In exploring the multilateralist principles at work in the U.S. system of
modified universality, and in applying those principles to suggest refinements
to that system, this Article has demonstrated that the universality/territoriality
framework is not the only analytical tool suited for exploring international in-
solvency. Indeed, it has suggested that the focus on universality and territori-
ality has, to some extent, prevented the choice-of-law processes embedded in
Section 304 proceedings from evolving into a fully realized system of modified
universality. But by building on an existing multilateralist foundation, the ap-
proach as modified retains the quality of territorialism inherent in any system
of multilateralist rules. I refer here not to territoriality, the international bank-
ruptcy theory, but to territorialism-that is, reliance on concepts of sover-
eignty and territorial jurisdiction. 251 I will conclude by speculating as to the
future of a continuing commitment to territorialism.
In a multilateralist system, locating the proper jurisdiction for the admini-
stration of an international bankruptcy depends largely on identifying the home
jurisdiction of the debtor. But this concept of a "home" jurisdiction is less
meaningful as applied to a debtor that is a transnational conglomerate than to a
debtor organized and operating in a single country. Similarly, the concept of
protecting a "local creditor" is less meaningful as applied to the local branch
of a multinational lender than to a truly local bank. Today it remains both pos-
sible and sensible to align entities (both debtors and creditors) with particular
jurisdictions. 252 As international commerce becomes increasingly denational-
ized, however, it may become less appropriate to use jurisdictional concepts to
order commercial relationships. This is true not only because the identification
of the appropriate jurisdiction will be made more difficult, but because juris-
250 The notion of reciprocity, for instance, which played a substantial role in Story's conflicts
theory, is no longer a major factor in bankruptcy cases. More importantly, courts applying Section
304 have evidenced a growing disinclination toward reflexive protection of U.S. citizens, choosing
instead approaches that for the most part favor foreign bankruptcy proceedings. See In re Axona,
88 B.R. 597, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing the "modem need for flexibility in the con-
struction of comity").
251 In other words, the choice of law depends not on the substance of competing laws, but on
locating the geographic jurisdiction to which the dispute should be assigned. See text accompany-
ing supra notes 91-92.
252 But see LoPucki, supra note 3, at 723-28 (arguing that a universalist approach does not
clearly resolve the issue of jurisdiction). The practical difficulties that arise even today in assigning
transnational corporate actors to particular jurisdictions engender much of the criticism of fixed ju-
risdictional rules. See id.
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diction-based inquiries are not compatible with legal systems that trade on de-
nationalized norms rather than sovereign authority.253 Should we, then, con-
tinue to anchor our analysis of international insolvencies in considerations of
place?
An alternative would be to depart from the substance-neutral, territory-
oriented approach common to both multilateralism and unilateralism---and to
both universality and territoriality-in favor of a substantive approach. In
some respects, that is what the extraregulatory approach adopted in Maxwell
and similar cases254 seeks to do: It attempts to identify and synthesize com-
peting rules in order to arrive at the best outcome for the parties involved.255
On a larger scale, perhaps, the development of a harmonized or supranational
bankruptcy law might be possible. 256 The idea of extricating international
bankruptcy law from the web of sovereignty-based concerns in which it is cur-
rently entangled is an attractive one, and is consistent with the larger shift in
the area of private international law away from sovereignty and toward dena-
tionalized systems of law. 257 As the demands of participants in international
business play an ever-greater role in shaping international business law, the ter-
ritory-based orientation of multilateralism may therefore cause that approach to
fall out of favor.
The system discussed in this Article, then, might be simply a way station
on the road to harmonization. But that road is a long one. The harmonization
of international bankruptcy law, which is dependent on the prior harmonization
of underlying business and commercial law, is hardly imminent. In the mean-
time, I argue against abandoning our long-standing commitment to universality
of treatment in cross-border bankruptcies. 258 Using traditional choice-of-law
analysis to illuminate what is, after all, a choice-of-law process can instead
render our existing system a better version of modified universality.
253 See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 160-61 (discussing private international law as
a discipline increasingly shaped by "the exigencies of international trade, rather than sover-
eignty").
254 See supra Part II.B.2.b for a discussion of these cases.
255 See Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 70, at 630-31.
256 One commentator has indeed suggested that the ad-hoc cooperation evident in the Max-
well line of cases will directly influence the development of a harmonized insolvency regime.
Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It Necessary?
Is It Possible?, 27 INT'L LAW. 881, 902 (1993).
257 See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 160.
258 Particularly in favor of territoriality, which, like universality, is a sovereignty-based sys-
tem.

